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Weinstein: Blockchain Neutrality

BLOCKCHAIN NEUTRALITY
Samuel N. Weinstein*
Blockchain technology is transforming how markets work.
Blockchains eliminate the need for trusted gatekeepers like
banks to execute, verify, and record transactions. In the
financial markets, their disruptive potential threatens both
Wall Street banks and Silicon Valley venture capitalists. How
blockchain technology is regulated will determine whether it
encourages or inhibits competition. Some blockchain
applications present serious fraud and systemic risks,
complicating regulation. This Article explores the antitrust and
competition policy challenges blockchain presents and proposes
a regulatory strategy, modeled on Internet regulation and net
neutrality principles, to unlock blockchain’s competitive
potential. It contends that financial regulators should promote
blockchain
competition—and
the
resulting
market
decentralization—except in cases where specific applications
are shown to harm consumers or threaten systemic safety.
Regulators also should ensure open access and nondiscrimination on dominant blockchain networks. This
approach will not only serve traditional antitrust goals of
lowering prices and promoting innovation, but it also might
achieve broader economic and social reform by reducing the
power and influence of the biggest financial institutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology has been touted as the next
transformational innovation of the computer age.1 The idea behind
blockchain is simple, but it has far-reaching implications.
Blockchains are distributed ledgers—decentralized databases that
allow communities of users to execute, verify, and permanently
record transactions using their own computers.2 These networks are
consensus-driven; community consent is required to change a
ledger.3 Once a transaction is recorded in a block of data and added
1 See, e.g., U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE MEETING 42 (Feb. 14, 2018) [hereinafter CFTC TAC MEETING] (statement of
Charley
Cooper),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/201807/tac_021418_transcript_1.pdf (“[T]he potential impacts of [blockchain] technology in
financial services . . . [are] massive. This isn’t a software update on a smartphone, right? . . .
This frankly goes to the very way in which capital markets operate.”); DIRECTORATE FOR FIN.
& ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., BLOCKCHAIN
TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETITION POLICY—ISSUES PAPER BY THE SECRETARIAT 3 (2018)
BLOCKCHAIN
AND
COMPETITION],
[hereinafter
OECD
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2018)47/en/pdf (“[Blockchain] technology can
work for almost every type of transaction involving value, including money, goods and
property. Its potential uses are almost limitless . . . .”); Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Antirust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Never Break the Chain: Pursuing Antifragility in
Antitrust Enforcement (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistantattorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-thirteenth-annual-conference
(“Blockchain is a ‘general purpose technology’ whose applications have the potential to
transform the entire economy.”); Kage Spatz, Eight Ways Blockchain Will Impact the World
YEC
(Mar.
9,
2018,
9:00
AM),
Beyond
Cryptocurrency,
FORBES:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2018/03/09/eight-ways-blockchain-will-impact-theworld-beyond-cryptocurrency/ (“From banking and secure communications to healthcare and
ride-sharing, blockchain will have a huge impact on our future.”); Don Tapscott & Rik
Kirkland, How Blockchains Could Change the World, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (May 6, 2016),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/technology-media-and-telecommunications/ourinsights/how-blockchains-could-change-the-world (“According to Tapscott Group CEO Don
Tapscott, blockchains . . . could revolutionize the world economy.”).
2 See Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin
Offerings, and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 463, 469
(2019) (“At their core, blockchains are decentralized databases maintained by a network of
computers. . . . [B]lockchains store tamper-resistant, resilient, and authenticated data,
enabling users to engage in pseudonymous transactions.” ); Kevin Werbach, Trust, but Verify:
Why the Blockchain Needs the Law, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 487, 500 (2018) (“A blockchain
is a kind of distributed ledger. It is ‘distributed’ in that there is no master copy.” (footnote
omitted)).
3 See Werbach, supra note 2, at 500–04 (explaining the role consensus plays in blockchains).
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to a chain, altering that transaction record is difficult.4 As a result,
blockchain could, in principle, reduce or eliminate the need for
central “gatekeepers” to provide trusted sources of transactional
verification and support.5 To many proponents, this feature is
blockchain’s greatest potential benefit.6 Rather than requiring a
government to supply currency, a title company to insure and record
title to real estate, or a Wall Street bank to provide trusted exchange
and clearing solutions for equities or derivatives trades, these
services could be furnished by a decentralized, blockchain-based
network run by its users.7

4 Rohr & Wright, supra note 2, at 471 (“[B]lockchain-based consensus mechanisms make
adding information to a blockchain purposefully difficult and even harder to remove once
saved, creating data that is hard to alter once stored.”).
5 See, e.g., Delrahim, supra note 1 (“The potential of blockchain is the ability to operate a
marketplace or network without a centralized intermediary.”); Steve Ranger, Blockchain
Won’t Save the World, but Might Make It a Better Place, ZDNET (June 1, 2018, 2:55 PM),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/blockchain-wont-save-the-world-but-might-make-it-a-betterplace (noting that blockchain “[e]nthusiasts” argue that the technology “could replace existing
gatekeepers—banks, governments or any other authority—with a peer-to-peer network of
trust where actions are transparent and visible to all”).
6 See, e.g., Ranger, supra note 5 (describing blockchain’s “utopian streak” and noting
advocates’ belief that, by replacing “existing gatekeepers,” blockchain could “usher[] in a
crypto-anarchist utopia”); Wilma Woo, ‘Crypto’s Benefit Is Fewer Gatekeepers’: Rockefeller
(Apr.
8,
2018,
10:30
AM),
Empire
Gets
into
Bitcoin,
BITCOINIST
https://bitcoinist.com/rockefeller-empire-buy-cryptocurrency/ (quoting venture capitalist
David Pakman as saying, “[g]atekeepers tend to charge rent or toll on users, . . . [t]he benefit
of the advent of crypto is that we have fewer gatekeepers”).
7 For example, bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are blockchain-based alternatives to fiat
currencies. See, e.g., Clem Chambers, Crypto Is Replacing Fiat Currency in Troubled
(Aug.
5,
2019,
10:38
AM),
Countries,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2019/08/05/crypto-is-replacing-fiat-currency-introubled-countries/ (discussing the possibility that bitcoin will replace fiat currencies).
Blockchain-based real estate title solutions also are in the works. A company called Propy
has partnered with the city of South Burlington, Vermont to create a property-deed
registration system based on blockchain. Ivan Kv, What Is Blockchain Deed Registration in
Real Estate?, PROPY (June 13, 2019), https://propy.com/blog/what-is-blockchain-deedregistration-in-real-estate/ (“With Propy’s assistance, the city will be able to scan,
cryptographically secure, and store deeds on the Ethereum blockchain.”). And a firm called
Level01 has launched a blockchain-based derivatives exchange. See Soft Launch in Hong
Kong, LEVEL01 (July 19, 2018), https://level01.io/2018/07/19/level01-derivatives-exchangesoft-launch-hong-kong/ (recounting a statement from the firm’s CEO that he envisions “a
Derivatives Exchange for traders and investors that is completely fair, transparent and
trustworthy[] by using Blockchain”).
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Blockchain’s use is already becoming widespread. Bitcoin,
perhaps the best known blockchain application, is surging;8
blockchain-based token sales, including initial coin offerings (ICOs)
and initial exchange offerings (IEOs), have raised billions of dollars
for companies over the past few years;9 and the world’s largest
provider of derivatives processing services is moving trillions of
dollars of transactions onto a new blockchain-based system.10 A
2018 PricewaterhouseCoopers survey of 600 executives found that
84% of their firms had some form of blockchain initiative
underway.11
Broad adoption of blockchain technology may have enormous
economic, social, and political ramifications. Entrenched
institutions whose power and position are based on providing
trusted goods or services might see their roles undermined or
fundamentally altered. Governments may discover that blockchainbased Bitcoin or JPM Coin12 competes effectively with their
currencies, and banks may find that many of their trust-based
services, such as equities and derivatives dealing, are no longer
See, e.g., Billy Bambrough, Bitcoin Is Still Climbing: Is This Time Different?, FORBES
(June 26, 2019, 1:18 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2019/06/26/bitcoinis-this-time-different/ (noting that bitcoin prices and adoption are increasing); Jeff John
Roberts, The Blockchain Industry Faces a Moment of Truth as High-Profile Projects Go Live,
FORTUNE (Oct. 21, 2020, 10:30 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/10/21/blockchain-industry-newbusinesses-polkadot-dfinity-filecoin/ (noting that Bitcoin has been “enjoy[ing] another boom”
and “everyone from Square to Harvard University has been investing in it”).
9 See
Paul P. Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, PLOS ONE (May 21, 2020),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0233018 (stating that ICOs
raised over $27 billion through the end of 2019); John Slyusarev, Analytical Report: IEOs in
BLOG
(Apr.
15,
2020),
2019-2020,
COINMARKETCAP
https://blog.coinmarketcap.com/2020/04/15/analytical-report-ieos-in-2019-2020/
(reporting
that IEOs raised a total of $1.7 billion in 2019).
10 See Michael del Castillo, $11 Trillion Bet: DTCC to Process Derivatives with Blockchain
Tech, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/11-trillion-bet-dtcc-clear-derivatives-blockchaintech (last updated Dec. 21, 2017) (stating that the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation
(DTCC) will “mov[e] $11tn worth of credit derivatives to a custom distributed ledger”).
11 STEVE DAVIS, HENRI ARSLANIAN, DICK FONG, ANDREW WATKINS, WILLIAM GEE & CHUN
YIN CHEUNG, PWC, PWC’S GLOBAL BLOCKCHAIN SURVEY 2018, at 1 (2018),
https://www.pwccn.com/en/research-and-insights/publications/global-blockchain-survey2018/global-blockchain-survey-2018-report.pdf.
12 J.P. Morgan recently created JPM Coin, a blockchain-based payment system that allows
users to “make instantaneous payments.” J.P. Morgan Creates Digital Coin for Payments,
J.P. MORGAN (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/news/digital-coin-payments.
8
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needed. Blockchain promises to usher in changes that could be as
sweeping as those the Internet has wrought over the past few
decades. Just as Internet-based businesses disrupted longestablished industries—travel, publishing, retail, and music and
video distribution, to name a few—blockchain may render obsolete
whole categories of firms and business models.
The changes promise to be particularly significant in the
financial-services sector. Blockchain-based capital markets
threaten Wall Street banks’ and Silicon Valley venture capitalists’
(VCs) market dominance. Equities and derivatives trading and
clearing platforms based on blockchain may reduce the role of
traditional dealers and big banks in these markets. Significant
parts of Wall Street’s and Silicon Valley’s long-standing business
models are at risk.13
Although blockchain has significant procompetitive potential,
certain blockchain applications also pose serious fraud and systemic
risks. Many ICOs have turned out to be fraudulent,14 and
decentralized financial-products trading will make regulators’ task
of tracking and mitigating systemic risks more difficult.
Blockchain’s ultimate impact in the financial markets—and in the
broad range of other markets it might remake—will depend in large
part on governments’ competition policy responses.15 Will regulators
create the conditions for blockchain-based businesses to transform
markets, as they did for the Internet in the past quarter century, or
will they disfavor these new business models to protect gatekeeper
institutions? To answer this question, financial regulators must
weigh blockchain’s potential for increasing competition against its
very real risks; so far, they are erring on the side of risk
prevention.16
See infra Section II.B.
See, e.g., SATIS GROUP, CRYPTOASSET MARKET COVERAGE INITIATION: NETWORK
CREATION 24–25 (2018), https://research.bloomberg.com/pub/res/d28giW28tf6G7T_Wr77aU0
gDgFQ (finding that “as a percentage of the total number of ICOs . . . approximately 78% of
ICO’s were Identified Scams,” although “as a percentage of the US dollars raised to-date . . .
only [about 11%] of ICO funding went to Identified Scams”).
15 Cf. Delrahim, supra note 1 (“[I]t is of utmost importance that we prevent competitive
abuses in markets where blockchain may offer consumers and businesses lower cost or higher
value options.”).
16 For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission has actively policed blockchainrelated fraud and enforced securities registration requirements against initial coin offerings.
13
14
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This Article argues that emerging blockchain-based financialservices networks offer a rare chance to make the financial sector
less concentrated, more competitive, and more democratic.
Financial regulators are uncertain stewards for this type of
transformation. If the regulatory agencies maintain their narrow
focus on fraud prevention and systemic-risk management, they may
miss a significant opportunity to help modernize the markets they
oversee. Instead, they should seek ways to promote the increased
competition that blockchain technology promises to create.
To meet this challenge, this Article proposes a regulatory
strategy, modeled on early Internet regulation, to unlock
blockchain’s competitive potential while mitigating the risk of
fraud. It contends that regulators should promote vigorous
blockchain
competition—and
the
resulting
market
decentralization—except in cases where specific applications are
shown to harm consumers or threaten systemic safety. To safeguard
the full flowering of blockchain competition, regulators also should
ensure open access and non-discrimination on dominant blockchain
networks. This strategy will serve traditional antitrust goals of
lowering prices, increasing output, and promoting innovation,17
while also potentially achieving broader economic and social ends
by reducing the power and influence of the biggest financial
institutions. These institutions, especially Wall Street banks, have
exercised control over financial-services markets for some time.18

See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Founder, Digital-Asset
Issuer with Fraudulent ICO (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019259 (announcing charges against an entrepreneur for conducting a fraudulent initial coin
offering that raised more than $42 million); Jay Clayton & J. Christopher Giancarlo, Opinion,
Regulators Are Looking at Cryptocurrency, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2018, 6:26 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-are-looking-at-cryptocurrency-1516836363
(discussing a statement from the chairmen of the SEC and CFTC explaining that the SEC “is
devoting a significant portion of its resources to the ICO market” and that “the SEC has made
it clear that federal securities laws apply regardless of whether the offered security . . . is
labeled a ‘coin’ or ‘utility token’”).
17 See
Guide to Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws (last visited Feb. 6, 2021) (stating that the
antitrust laws “promote vigorous competition,” which “gives consumers . . . the benefits of
lower prices, higher quality products and services, more choices, and greater innovation”).
18 See, e.g., Martin Arnold, How US Banks Took over the Financial World, FIN. TIMES (Sept.
16, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/6d9ba066-9eee-11e8-85da-eeb7a9ce36e4 (“Wall
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Access to capital is dominated by leading Wall Street firms and
Silicon Valley VCs; Wall Street also controls most financial products
trading.19 Blockchain-based networks offer the opportunity to
release this stranglehold, giving individuals and firms more
freedom about how they consume financial services. This shift
might serve distributive goals, too. Availability of financial services
historically has been limited by class and race.20 By providing
widely accessible competitive alternatives to traditional banks and
VCs, public blockchain-based networks could broaden opportunities
for individuals and firms from diverse backgrounds to raise capital
and enter the financial markets.
A burgeoning body of legal scholarship has documented the
spread and implications of blockchain, addressing how the
technology works and its potential to upend various markets.21
Street’s top groups . . . [have] establish[ed] a seemingly unshakeable dominance in global
corporate and investment banking.”).
19 See, e.g., Christine Hurt, Initial Public Offerings and the Failed Promise of
Disintermediation, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 703, 705 (2008) (“A small number of
investment banks and the underwriters and brokers they employ act as intermediaries that
distribute and market [initial public] offerings for a substantial fee.”); Ethan Mollick, Swept
Away by the Crowd? Crowdfunding, Venture Capital, and the Selection of Entrepreneurs 4
(Mar. 25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2239204 (“For at least
a quarter century, technology entrepreneurship has . . . been defined by the Silicon Valley
model . . . . In that model, venture capital firms serve as a key actor, and are often considered
to be the most important actors in the system outside of the entrepreneurs themselves.”
(citations omitted)).
20 See, e.g., Adam Gordon, Note, The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal Changes
in Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to Whites and Out
of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 189, 209 (2005) (demonstrating that the Federal
Housing Authority’s mortgage insurance program “systematically discriminated against
African-Americans” resulting in “much lower rates of lending to nonwhites than to whites”);
Lynnise E. Phillips Pantin, The Wealth Gap and the Racial Disparities in the Startup
Ecosystem, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419, 442 (2018) (“[A]s a practical matter, startup funding
almost exclusively goes to White men.” (footnote omitted)).
21 See, e.g., PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE
OF CODE 2–9 (2018) (describing blockchain technology, its applications, and the legal
challenges it poses); Marc Pilkington, Blockchain Technology: Principles and Applications, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL TRANSFORMATIONS 225, 225–53 (F. Xavier Olleros &
Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016) (describing blockchain technology and its applications); Lin
William Cong & Zhiguo He, Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts 20–31 (Dec. 27,
2018)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(on
file
with
author),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2985764 (analyzing blockchain’s impact
on competition and industrial organization); Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi,
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Much of that scholarship has focused on the financial markets,
especially the development of cryptocurrencies.22 A handful of
scholars have addressed the regulatory challenges blockchain
presents, including in the financial services sector,23 but this
literature is still in its infancy. This is particularly true for antitrust
and competition scholarship, which is especially sparse.24 This
Article addresses that gap in the blockchain literature.

Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia 4–8, 18–24 (Mar. 10,
2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2580664 (describing blockchain
technology and analyzing its effect on centralized authorities).
22 See, e.g., Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David Wishnick, CoinOperated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 634–58 (2019) (surveying the fifty ICOs that
raised the most money in 2017 and analyzing the relationship between the promises the
promoters of those ICOs made and the characteristics of the digital assets they ultimately
delivered); Ryan Surujnath, Note, Off the Chain! A Guide to Blockchain Derivatives Markets
and the Implications on Systemic Risk, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 257, 279–84 (2017)
(analyzing use of blockchain technology in derivatives markets); Lawrence J. Trautman, Is
Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of Financial Services?, 69 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 232, 240 (2016) (analyzing use of blockchain technology in financial-services markets).
23 See, e.g., Cohney et al., supra note 22, at 646–60 (discussing whether regulation of ICOs
would be beneficial); Rohr & Wright, supra note 2 (advocating for increased certainty
regarding regulation of utility tokens in the United States); Werbach, supra note 2, at 520
(“Regulators around the world need to consider how to draw lines around token offerings that
protect investors without chilling innovation.”); Hossein Kakavand, Nicolette Kost De Sevres
& Bart Chilton, The Blockchain Revolution: An Analysis of Regulation and Technology
Related to Distributed Ledger Technologies 20–24 (Jan. 1, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2849251
(surveying
financial
regulators’ approach to blockchain applications in Europe and the United States).
24 See Konstantinos Stylianou, What Can the First Blockchain Antitrust Case Teach Us
About the Crypto-Economy?, JOLT: DIGEST (Apr. 26, 2019), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest
/what-can-the-first-blockchain-antitrust-case-teach-us-about-the-crypto-economy (“Of all the
areas blockchain has made headlines in, antitrust has ranked fairly low.”). For examples of
blockchain-related antitrust scholarship, see Thibault Schrepel, Is Blockchain the Death of
Antitrust Law? The Blockchain Antitrust Paradox, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 281 (2019)
(describing challenges blockchain poses for antitrust analysis and enforcement and proposing
reforms to ameliorate those challenges); Ai Deng, Smart Contracts and Blockchains: Steroid
for
Collusion?
4
(Sept.
11,
2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3187010 (analyzing whether the use of
smart contracts on blockchains will facilitate collusion, especially among members of
blockchain consortia); Stephan U. Breu, Blockchains and Cybercurrencies Challenging
Antitrust and Competition Law 6 (Dec. 1, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3081914 (discussing the challenges
blockchain technology creates for antitrust and competition laws). There is less scholarship
on blockchain’s ramifications for competition policy. See Ioannis Lianos, Blockchain
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In doing so, the Article draws a distinction between antitrust and
competition policy. The former term is used here to refer to
enforcement of federal and state antitrust statutes, particularly the
Sherman and Clayton Acts.25 This Article treats the latter term as
a broader concept encompassing not only decisions about antitrust
enforcement priorities, but a wider set of choices made by Congress,
the executive branch, sector regulators, and state and local
governments that establish the terms on which competition takes
place in various markets.26 It argues that concerns among some
scholars and practitioners that blockchain threatens effective
antitrust enforcement are premature.27 Despite the technology’s
disruptive nature, the substantive antitrust challenges blockchain
poses are not novel and can be addressed using current law and
enforcement strategies. Indeed, the transparency blockchain offers
may simplify discovery and prosecution of antitrust violations.
Rather than locating and sifting through hundreds of thousands of
documents to prove a price-fixing conspiracy, enforcers may find the
relevant evidence permanently recorded on a cartel’s blockchain.
The ability of blockchain users to mask their identities by employing
pseudonyms may raise some technical enforcement challenges, but

Competition: Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Digital Economy—Competition Law
Implications, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 329,
332 (Philipp Hacker et al. eds., 2019) (noting that blockchain’s competition policy implications
are underexplored).
25 These statutes prohibit certain anticompetitive agreements between firms, conduct that
unlawfully creates or maintains a monopoly, and mergers whose effect “may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (prohibiting
agreements “in restraint of trade or commerce”); id. § 2 (prohibiting monopolization); id. § 18
(prohibiting anticompetitive mergers).
26 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is an example of competition policy. Pub. L. 104104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). By requiring local
telephone monopolists to share their networks with new competitors, the Act aimed to
maximize certain forms of telecommunications competition. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils.
Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999) (stating that the Telecommunications Act subjected incumbent
local exchange carriers “to a host of duties intended to facilitate market entry”).
27 See, e.g., Schrepel, supra note 24, at 335 (“In the face of blockchain, current antitrust law
may well be eliminated.”).
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pseudonymity does not guarantee anonymity.28 Violators typically
can be identified, and remedies can attach.29
In contrast, this Article contends that blockchain presents new
and difficult competition policy issues that will require innovative
regulatory solutions. Because blockchain-related technologies have
applications across industries, multiple regulators may be
positioned to make blockchain competition policy. Even if the details
differ between regulatory regimes, the question these regulators
will face should be similar: how to manage markets where
incumbents are under attack by new competitors using blockchainbased systems to decentralize and deconcentrate industries.
Agencies charged with developing blockchain-related competition
policy must grapple with at least three fundamental challenges: (1)
balancing the benefits of the increased competition that blockchain
networks will make possible against concerns for marketplace and
consumer safety; (2) determining how much market
decentralization to promote or tolerate; and (3) deciding whether
and how to promote standardization, open-access, and nondiscrimination requirements on blockchain networks.
This Article focuses on the financial-services industry, where
blockchain-based technologies might fundamentally alter the way
business is conducted. Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin are the leading
edge of this transformation, but they likely are just the first step in
remaking the financial sector. Bigger changes may be coming in
capital markets and equities and derivatives trading. Blockchain
technologies are enabling firms to raise significant amounts of
capital directly from the public. Several companies already have
28 See Joseph Bonneau & Steven Goldfeder, Five Myths About Bitcoin, WASH. POST (Dec.
15,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/five-myths/five-myths-aboutbitcoin/2017/12/15/7a506742-e044-11e7-8679-a9728984779c_story.html (“[T]he vast majority
of bitcoin users don’t get significantly more privacy than they would with traditional bank
transfers . . . because it’s possible to link a user’s pseudonyms together by studying patterns
in the blockchain.”).
29 See, e.g., Tom Robinson, Bitcoin Is Not Anonymous, RESPUBLICA: THE DISRAELI ROOM
(Mar. 24, 2015), https://www.respublica.org.uk/disraeli-room-post/2015/03/24/bitcoin-is-notanonymous/ (describing how prosecutors successfully linked pseudonymous bitcoin
transactions to Ross Ulbricht, who had been accused of owning and operating Silk Road, an
online marketplace engaged in various illegal activities). Robinson explained that Bitcoin is
“pseudonymous rather than anonymous” and that “in many cases identities can be linked to
bitcoin addresses.” Id.
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used ICOs to raise over $100 million each,30 more than an average
initial public offering (IPO) raises, and, in 2019, companies used
blockchain-based IEOs to raise $1.7 billion.31 These new funding
models might endanger traditional sources of capital formation: if
businesses can use token sales to raise public money directly, fewer
reasons exist to pay VCs and Wall Street for these services.
Blockchains are also being used to build equities and derivatives
trading and clearing platforms that can reduce or eliminate the
need for traditional dealers and big banks in these markets.32 These
platforms allow individual users to trade directly with one another
from their personal terminals.33
Together, these blockchain-based services potentially could
compete for large chunks of incumbent financial institutions’ most
profitable businesses. This development could have significant
economic and social consequences. The financial services sector
represents seven percent of U.S. GDP,34 and Wall Street banks—for
many decades—have been among the most important private
30 Olga Kharif, How’s that ICO Working Out?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 14, 2018,
5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-14/crypto-s-15-biggest-icos-bythe-numbers (listing the biggest ICOs from recent years, including eleven that raised between
$153 million and $4.2 billion).
31 Slyusarev, supra note 9 (describing IEO fundraising).
32 See, e.g., Alexander Osipovich, Blockchain Makes Inroads into the Stock Market’s $1
S T.
J.
(Nov.
7,
2019,
8:00
AM),
Trillion
Plumbing
System,
WALL
https://www.wsj.com/articles/blockchain-makes-inroads-into-the-stock-markets-1-trillionplumbing-system-11573131600 (describing Paxos, a blockchain-based equities tradesettlement and clearing platform); Soft Launch in Hong Kong, supra note 7 (describing launch
of Level01, a blockchain-based derivatives exchange).
33 See,
e.g.,
LEVEL01,
WHITE
PAPER
4
(2018),
https://level01.io/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/level01_whitepaper_final1-2.pdf (“Level01 allows users to trade
options contracts directly with one another peer-to-peer (P2P) without the need for an
intermediary broker . . .”).
34 See Financial Services Spotlight: The Financial Services Industry in the United States,
https://www.selectusa.gov/financial-services-industry-united-states
(last
SELECTUSA,
visited Feb. 8, 2020) (“In 2018, finance and insurance represented 7.4 percent (or $1.5 trillion)
of U.S. gross domestic product.”). A broader standard definition of the financial sector—which
includes finance, insurance, and real estate (dubbed “FIRE”)—represents closer to twenty
percent of U.S. GDP. See Christopher Witko, How Wall Street Became a Big Chunk of the
U.S. Economy – and When the Democrats Signed on, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Mar. 29,
2016, 12:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/29/howwall-street-became-a-big-chunk-of-the-u-s-economy-and-when-the-democrats-signed-on/
(“(FIRE) sector now accounts for 20 percent of GDP . . . .”).
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institutions in the country.35 The outsized profits these institutions
garner have played a role in the nation’s growing income
inequality,36 and their gatekeeper function has limited which firms
can raise money and who can trade in financial products.
Blockchain-based networks offer the opportunity to reshape this
financial-services landscape.
Because they oversee financial markets—including capital
markets and equities and derivatives trading—sector regulators,
especially the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), likely will play a
significant role in determining whether blockchain realizes its
transformative potential. In doing so, they must determine how to
balance enhanced blockchain competition against marketplace and
consumer safety, how to manage market decentralization, and
whether to promote standardization, open-access, and nondiscrimination on blockchain networks.
Of these issues, perhaps the most pressing is how to weigh the
prospects for increased blockchain-related competition and its many
benefits against threats to consumer safety and systemic soundness
arising from blockchain networks. In antitrust cases, agencies and
courts typically reject safety-related justifications for competition
restrictions.37 Sector regulators view this balance differently.

35 See, e.g., John Cassidy, What Good Is Wall Street?, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 22, 2010),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/11/29/what-good-is-wall-street (“Even after [the
2008 financial crisis], there is a tendency in Congress and the White House to defer to Wall
Street because what happens there . . . is essential to the country’s prosperity.”).
36 See Ken-Hou Lin & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Financialization and U.S. Income
Inequality, 1970–2008, 118 AM. J. SOC. 1284, 1285 (2013) (asserting that financialization is
“a critical institutional mechanism encouraging the post-1970s surge in U.S. income
inequality”).
37 See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462–64 (1986) (holding that the
Federation’s policy requiring members to deny insurers’ requests for dental x-rays violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and rejecting
the Federation’s argument that the restraint was lawful under the rule of reason because it
was designed to protect patients from being deprived of adequate dental care); Nat’l Soc’y of
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693–95 (1978) (rejecting defendant’s proffered
safety justification for its ban on competitive bidding and stating that defendant’s attempt to
justify the ban “on the basis of the potential threat that competition poses to the public safety
and the ethics of its profession is nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the
Sherman Act”).
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Despite statutory mandates to promote competition,38 the SEC and
CFTC strongly favor consumer safety and systemic risk prevention
over competition concerns.39 These agencies have been active in the
blockchain space, especially with regard to ICOs and
cryptocurrencies.40 Considering their regulatory priorities, it is
unsurprising that the agencies’ focus to date has been on fraud
prevention and classification and registration of financial products
and entities.41 Less attention is being paid to broader competition

38 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)–(2) (2018) (“Before promulgating a regulation . . . or issuing
an order,” the CFTC “shall consider the costs and benefits” of its action, including
“considerations of the efficiency, competitiveness, and financial integrity of futures
markets.”); 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2018) (“Whenever pursuant to [the Securities Act of 1933] the
[SEC] is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action
is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in
addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.”); id. § 78w(a)(2) (“[The SEC] and the Secretary of the
Treasury, in making rules and regulations . . . shall consider among other matters the impact
[they] would have on competition. The [SEC] and the Secretary of the Treasury shall not
adopt any such rule or regulation which would impose a burden on competition not necessary
or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.”).
39 See, e.g., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Competition: The
Forgotten
Fourth
Pillar
of
the
SEC’s
Mission
(Oct.
11,
2018),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-jackson-101118 (observing that that the SEC has
“forgotten a crucial part of [its] mission: to pursue the kind of vigorous competition that
American investors deserve”).
40 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Orchestrator of
Cryptocurrency
Scheme
Ensnaring
Physicians
(Feb.
11,
2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-32 (announcing the SEC’s charges against an
individual who allegedly perpetrated a “digital asset scheme that defrauded approximately
150 investors”); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Obtains Emergency Order
Halting Fraudulent Coin Offering Scheme (May 29, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2018-94 (announcing a court order halting ICO fraud involving Titanium Blockchain
Infrastructure Services); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Halts Fraudulent
Scheme Involving Unregistered ICO (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2018-53 (announcing charges against the co-founders of Centra Tech., Inc. for
perpetrating a fraudulent ICO that raised over $32 million).
41 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 40; Clayton & Giancarlo, supra note 16 (statement by
the chairmen of the SEC and CFTC advising that those agencies “along with other federal
and state regulators and criminal authorities, will continue to work together to bring
transparency and integrity to these markets and, importantly, to deter and prosecute fraud
and abuse”). Clayton and Giancarlo also warned “market participants, including lawyers,
trading venues and financial services firms” not to “elevate form over substance” in deciding
whether to register coins or utility tokens as regulated securities. Id.
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issues. This approach is not balanced; it tilts heavily toward harm
prevention.
This Article argues that sector regulators should promote the
increased competition that blockchain-based networks make
possible, rather than focusing solely on the need to ameliorate the
potential systemic risk and fraud-related harms those networks
may engender. FCC regulation of the telephony system and, later,
the Internet provides a useful model for the financial regulatory
agencies in this regard. Net neutrality rules and earlier FCC
regulations struck a balance between promoting innovation and
competition and protecting the public from unsafe practices.42 These
rules prohibited networks from discriminating against downstream
competitors except when their applications were harmful or
fraudulent.43 A similar approach makes sense for the SEC and
CFTC as they grapple with emerging blockchain-related
competition-policy issues. In general, the agencies should think
systematically about how to encourage blockchain-based
competition. A narrow focus on fraud and registration requirements
misses the forest for the trees.
Market decentralization poses related but distinct challenges for
regulators. Among blockchain’s most lauded attributes is its
potential to democratize and decentralize markets.44 In theory,
blockchain technology offers the possibility for markets to become
more competitive by reducing the power of gatekeeper firms—
See infra notes 222–226 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5622 (2015)
(explaining that the Open Internet Order’s restrictions on Internet service providers blocking
or discriminating against certain content and applications were “subject to an exception for
‘reasonable network management,’ allowing service providers the freedom to address
legitimate needs such as avoiding network congestion and combating harmful or illegal
content”); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 141, 169 (2003) (advocating for “the practice of requiring public harm to justify”
“discrimination against certain content and applications” in the “broadband context”).
44 See, e.g., Yan Chen, Blockchain Tokens and the Potential Democratization of
Entrepreneurship and Innovation, 61 BUS. HORIZONS 567, 573–74 (2018) (arguing that
blockchain tokens might democratize access to capital and investment opportunities,
potentially reshaping the entrepreneurship and innovation landscape); Dave Roos, Here’s
How Blockchain Will Eliminate Banks and Democratize Money, SEEKER (Jan. 25, 2017, 2:44
PM), https://www.seeker.com/how-blockchain-will-eliminate-banks-and-democratize-money2214709749.html (describing blockchain’s potential to “permanently disrupt the way we
think about money”).
42
43
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including platform companies—and by creating the potential for
new competitors to emerge. This decentralization may have noneconomic benefits too, including spreading opportunity beyond elite
institutions and offering market access to underserved populations.
But decentralization also raises challenges for regulators. The more
decentralized a market becomes, the more problematic it is for
regulators to monitor market participants.45 In financial markets,
decentralization can create significant difficulties. One only has to
recall the role derivatives products played in the 2008 financial
crisis to be reminded of the risks posed by widespread, unregulated
financial contracts. Presently, the CFTC and SEC can monitor
much of the world’s riskiest financial activity by keeping tabs on the
largest regulated banks.46 Decentralization through blockchain will
likely complicate that task and may compromise consumer safety
and systemic stability.
Nonetheless, because the benefits of decentralization in the
financial markets may be significant, this Article argues that
regulators should resist the temptation to implement policies that
favor incumbent big banks simply because they are already heavily
regulated. Instead, the agencies should promote decentralization
while developing ways to address the safety and fraud threats it
poses. The use of regulatory nodes on private (permissioned)
blockchain networks, which grant the agencies direct access to all
the information on a blockchain, may be one way to achieve this
goal.47
The third key competition policy challenge blockchain
technologies raise for regulators is how to handle standardization,
open-access, and non-discrimination issues on blockchain networks.
William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1205 (“[D]ecentralization
serves as a barrier to effective monitoring.”).
46 See id. (“[R]egardless of what we may think about the success of financial regulators in
reining in the behavior of large financial institutions since the financial crisis, regulators at
least benefit from the fact that the relevant players are readily identifiable and their
behaviors are subject to extensive disclosure requirements.”).
47 Regulatory or supervisory nodes are access points from which regulators can observe all
transactions recorded on a blockchain. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has stated its
intention to study the use of supervisory nodes on financial-services blockchain networks.
FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOS., BEYOND THEORY: GETTING PRACTICAL WITH BLOCKCHAIN 19–
20 (2019), https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/fintech/beyond-theory-getting-practicalwith-blockchain.aspx.
45
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These issues might arise in a variety of ways. To the extent that
permissioned blockchains become necessary to compete in certain
markets, firms controlling those networks might discriminate
against rivals and otherwise harm competition. Or public
(permissionless) blockchain networks might institute rules favoring
execution of certain transactions over other transactions.
Intellectual property rights and standard setting also could play a
key role in how blockchain-based competition develops. Blockchainrelated patent holders could use their rights strategically to limit
competition and establish (or retain) market power.
Anticompetitive abuses of the standard-setting process for
blockchain technologies is also a risk.
To maximize blockchain-based competition, this Article contends
that regulators (or, if necessary, Congress) should require or
encourage open blockchain standards and mandate that dominant
blockchain networks offer open and non-discriminatory access to
users who meet reasonable and fair membership criteria. Like netneutrality rules for the Internet (before they were overturned),48
this approach will increase competition and innovation on
blockchain networks and make it more difficult for the big banks
that currently dominate financial services to continue to do so.49
Having analyzed the foundational competition-policy issues
blockchain presents, this Article applies those general principles to
four specific blockchain competition problems that have arisen or
likely will arise in financial markets: “paid prioritization” (accepting
compensation to provide faster service to certain customers on the
blockchain, thereby disfavoring competitors); the spread of
blockchain-based derivatives trading and clearing; the use of token
sales to raise capital; and the anticompetitive abuse of blockchainrelated intellectual property rights and standards.
The remainder of the Article is organized in four Parts. Part II
describes blockchain technology generally and explains its uses in
financial-services markets. Part III analyzes the antitrust risks
blockchain technology raises and argues that, despite the new
48 See Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 312 (2018) (overturning the FCC’s
2015 Open Internet Order, which had codified net neutrality rules).
49 See, e.g., Wu, supra note 43, at 142 (asserting that net neutrality’s goal is to “preserv[e]
a Darwinian competition among every conceivable use of the Internet so that . . . only the
best survive”).
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technological setting, concerns that such risks exceed the bounds of
current antitrust doctrine or the capabilities of the antitrust
enforcement agencies are premature. Part IV describes the
competition policy challenges blockchain networks pose and
proposes an analytical theory for addressing these challenges. Part
V applies this theory of blockchain competition policy to four key
issues that have arisen or are likely to emerge in the financialservices sector.

II. BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN
FINANCIAL MARKETS
While most commonly associated with Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies, blockchain technology has potentially broad
applications across industries. This Part explains blockchain’s
general functions and features and describes its uses in financial
markets. In particular, it details blockchain’s potential impact on
capital markets and financial-products trading and clearing. It also
explores the effects blockchain competition might have on
incumbent financial institutions.
A. WHAT IS BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY?

Blockchains (or distributed ledgers) are decentralized databases
that allow communities of users to make permanent records of
transactions using their own devices.50 No central gatekeeper
determines whether alterations can be made to a blockchain;
changes are made by user consensus.51 As a result, once a
transaction is recorded in a block of data added to the chain, altering
that transaction record is difficult.52 In the case of Bitcoin, a user
would have to control over fifty percent of the Bitcoin network’s

50 See Rohr & Wright, supra note 2, at 469–70 (describing fundamental characteristics of
blockchains); Werbach, supra note 2, at 499–500 (describing blockchains as distributed
ledgers).
51 See Werbach, supra note 2, at 500–04 (explaining the role consensus plays in
blockchains).
52 See Rohr & Wright, supra note 2, at 471 (“[B]lockchain-based consensus mechanisms
make adding information to a blockchain purposefully difficult and even harder to remove
once saved, creating data that is hard to alter once stored.”).
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computing power to change a transaction record.53 Blocks become
increasingly secure as time passes and as additional blocks are
added to the chain, because changing an earlier block would require
changing all subsequent blocks.54 Blockchains can be public
(permissionless) or private (permissioned). The former are open to
anyone (Bitcoin is an example), while members may limit access to
the latter.
Blockchains often rely on “smart contracts” to facilitate
transactions. Smart contracts are pieces of computer code that
execute agreements automatically when pre-set conditions are
fulfilled.55 For example, a smart contract could be created to
transfer title to an asset when a set amount of money is deposited
in an account. Smart contracts can be stored on blockchains,
ensuring that their terms are securely recorded and remain difficult
to change.
The scope of applications for blockchain technology is broad.56 It
can be used to record title to real estate more efficiently,57 create
53 A “51 percent attack” could occur if a user or group of users controlling a majority of
network computing power leveraged that control to change a transaction history and stop
BITCOINDEVELOPER,
new
transactions
from
being
confirmed.
See
Glossary,
https://developer.bitcoin.org/glossary.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2021) (defining a 51 percent
attack).
54 See Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq (last visited Feb. 8,
2021) (“For new transactions to be confirmed, they need to be included in a block along with
a mathematical proof of work. . . . The proof of work is also designed to depend on the previous
block to force a chronological order in the block chain. This makes it exponentially difficult to
reverse previous transactions because this requires the recalculation of the proofs of work of
all the subsequent blocks.”).
55 Computer scientist Nick Szabo is credited with introducing the idea of smart contracts.
He described them as “computerized transaction protocol[s] that execute[] the terms of a
contract.” Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts, UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM (1994),
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinte
rschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html. “The general objectives of smart
contract design,” Szabo asserted, “are to satisfy common contractual conditions (such as
payment terms, liens, confidentiality, and even enforcement), minimize exceptions both
malicious and accidental, and minimize the need for trusted intermediaries. Related
economic goals include lowering fraud loss, arbitration and enforcement costs, and other
transaction costs.” Id.
56 See supra note 1.
57 See, e.g., J. MICHAEL GRAGLIA & CHRISTOPHER MELLON, BLOCKCHAIN AND PROPERTY IN
2018:
AT
THE
END
OF
THE
BEGINNING
2
(2018),
https://www.newamerica.org/documents/2121/Graglia_Mellon_blockchain.pdf (making a
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more secure voting systems,58 more reliably authenticate people’s
identities,59 better maintain healthcare records,60 and reduce
fraud.61 At present, however, many of the most developed uses for
blockchain are in the financial markets.
B. BLOCKCHAIN’S USE IN FINANCIAL MARKETS

Blockchain adoption promises to have a significant impact on
how financial markets function. Currently, its best-known
application is as the architecture supporting cryptocurrencies like
Bitcoin and Ethereum. But cryptocurrencies likely are just the tip
of the iceberg. This Section will address two other areas where
blockchain will change how financial markets operate: capital
formation and financial products trading. Blockchain is being used
to create potent new ways to raise capital, through token sales like
ICOs and IEOs.62 These mechanisms threaten traditional funding
“broad case as to why blockchain makes sense for real estate”); Marc Shaw, Will the Power of
Blockchain Mean the End of Title Insurance Companies in 20 Years?, FORBES (June 22, 2018,
8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesrealestatecouncil/2018/06/22/will-the-power-ofblockchain-mean-the-end-of-title-insurance-companies-in-20-years/ (“Blockchain technology
will certainly eliminate most fraud and tampering that exists with ownership records located
at a county clerk’s office and convert land records to a distributed ledger.”).
58 Frances Katz, Can Blockchain Fix America’s Voting System?, THE WEEK (July 17, 2018),
https://theweek.com/articles/762519/blockchain-fix-americas-voting-system (arguing that
one way to “rebuild trust in the American voting system . . . is through blockchain”).
59 See, e.g., ORI JACOBOVITZ, BLOCKCHAIN FOR IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 2 (2016),
https://www.cs.bgu.ac.il/~frankel/TechnicalReports/2016/16-02.pdf
(contending
that
blockchain technology offers a solution to the problem of digital identity verification, allowing
consumers to “login and verify payments without having to enter any of the traditional
username and password information”).
60 See, e.g., Shelby Livingston, Will Blockchain Save the Healthcare System?, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (Feb. 9, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20190209/
TRANSFORMATION02/190209953/will-blockchain-save-the-healthcare-system (describing
prospects for achieving the “holy grail for blockchain in healthcare—creating complete and
portable medical records that connect all the disparate pieces in a patient’s health history”).
61 See, e.g., Daniel Newman, 3 Ways Blockchain Can Help Combat Fraud, FORBES (Apr. 17,
2018, 9:14 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielnewman/2018/04/17/3-ways-blockchaincan-help-combat-fraud/ (surveying ways that “businesses can combat fraud with blockchain”).
62 While ICOs are initiated by individual companies, IEOs “are offered directly by online
trading platforms on behalf of companies.” Initial Exchange Offerings (IEOs) – Investor Alert,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-andbulletins/ia_initialexchangeofferings. One attraction of an IEO as compared to an ICO is that
the trading platform can perform due diligence on the offering. See Gertrude Chavez-
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models—seeking capital from VCs or via public offerings—though
regulation has complicated this picture. And blockchain technology
likely will alter the way equities, derivatives, and other financial
instruments are traded and cleared, imperiling the dominance and
huge profits big banks have enjoyed in these markets.
1. Impact on Capital Markets. One of the most high-profile uses
of blockchain technology is as the infrastructure for token sales,
such as ICOs. Blockchain allows firms to raise capital through the
sale of tokens to the broader public rather than through established
public markets or traditional private funding sources. In many
cases, these tokens are resold on secondary markets.63 The growth
of ICO funding was initially explosive. By one estimate, ICOs raised
$7.8 billion in 2018, up from $6.2 billion in 2017, and $90 million in
2016.64 IEOs, which are also growing in popularity, raised an
estimated $1.7 billion in 2019.65
The technology for initiating token sales is relatively simple,
making this funding model broadly available.66 Token sales reduce
costs for offerors by eliminating the need for investment bankers,

Dreyfuss, Explainer: Initial Exchange Offerings Flourish in Crypto Market, REUTERS (June
20, 2019, 1:55 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-crypto-currencies-offeringsexplainer/explainer-initial-exchange-offerings-flourish-in-crypto-market-idUSKCN1TL2E0
(stating that exchanges organizing IEOs “effectively act as middlemen, performing functions
such as due diligence on a project, ‘know your customer’ screening, marketing and selling
tokens to customers”).
63 Rohr & Wright, supra note 2, at 479 (“[Tokens] are actively traded on secondary
cryptocurrency markets around the globe . . . .”).
64 CB INSIGHTS, THE BLOCKCHAIN REPORT 2020, at 47 (2020), https://www.tagonline.org/wp
-content/uploads/2020/05/CB-Insights_Blockchain-Report-2020.pdf. Estimates of ICO
funding vary due, in part, to a lack of uniform disclosure standards for ICOs. See Justina Lee,
How Much Have ICOs Raised in 2018? Depends on Who You Ask, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 4, 2018,
7:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-05/how-much-have-token-salesraised-in-2018-depends-on-who-you-ask (“[I]t remains hard to ascertain the amount of funds
a[n] issuer claims it’s raised when no one has to submit any regulated filings or even reveal
their identities.”).
65 Slyusarev,
supra note 9; see also PWC, 6TH ICO/STO REPORT 9 (2020),
https://www.pwc.ch/en/publications/2020/Strategy
&_ICO_STO_Study_Version_Spring_2020.pdf (“IEOs are experiencing a strong momentum
in crypto sphere.”).
66 See Rohr & Wright, supra note 2, at 464 (“With less than a hundred lines of code, anyone
can generate blockchain-based tokens and sell them to the public.” (footnote omitted)).
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venture capitalists, and other financial intermediaries.67 While
regulation has cooled the ICO market,68 the token-sale model, or
other blockchain-based funding mechanisms, could potentially
upend established capital market structures.69
In the past few decades, the primary early-stage funding model
for technology startups that are not self-financed has been to seek
venture capital, angel investment, or, more recently,
crowdfunding.70 While these sources of capital represent only a
small percentage of total new business funding—with personal
funds and bank loans making up the lion’s share—they can be
particularly significant for early growth.71 Access to VC and angel
funding is geographically and socio-economically limited.72 A study
of venture, angel, and crowdfunding investment showed that, in
2014, thirty percent of firms receiving VC funding were located in
four metropolitan areas: New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and

67 Id. at 465 (“Tokens sellers . . . avoid traditional gatekeepers like investment bankers and
national securities exchanges, which control access to the capital markets.”).
68 See, e.g., Olga Kharif, Crypto Coin Sales Stage Revival After Bursting of ICO Bubble,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2019, 10:10 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0410/crypto-coin-sales-stage-revival-after-bursting-of-ico-bubble (“ICO sales . . . have dropped
steeply . . . in the wake of a U.S. regulatory crackdown and market collapse.”).
69 Rohr & Wright, supra note 2, at 464 (“Blockchains are transforming capital markets.”).
70 Some data shows that the major sources of initial funding for new U.S. businesses are
“personal and family savings, bank business loans, and personal credit cards.” DANE
STANGLER, INARA S. TAREQUE & ARNOBIO MORELIX, TRENDS IN VENTURE CAPITAL, ANGEL
INVESTMENTS, AND CROWDFUNDING ACROSS THE FIFTY LARGEST U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS
1 (2016), https://www.kauffman.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/ASE-Briefing-1216_FINAL.
pdf.
71 Id. (stating that “venture capital, angel investments, and . . . crowdfunding” are less
prevalent funding forms than personal money and bank loans, “but they can be
disproportionately important for business growth”).
72 See Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs,
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 224 (“[T]he angel investing industry and venture capital industry
have their own inherent biases. Early round investing depends greatly on networks and
geography . . . .”).
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Boston.73 This was the case for angel investing as well.74 Racial,
gender, and socio-economic disparities also exist in VC funding.
Minority-run businesses have disproportionately low VC funding
rates.75 The same is true for businesses run by founders with nonelite socio-economic backgrounds.76
Crowdfunding is similar to blockchain-based funding in that it
allows companies to raise startup capital from the general public.
Theoretically, crowdfunding offers the opportunity to reduce the
geographic concentration of startup investment by making it easier
for remote investors to learn of and fund firms in geographically
diverse areas.77 The crowdfunding model also holds promise for
circumventing the racial, gender, and socio-economic biases that
plague VC funding, though some empirical research shows that

73 STANGLER ET AL., supra note 70, at 3; see also John Armour & Luca Enriques, The
Promise and Perils of Crowdfunding: Between Corporate Finance and Consumer Contracts,
81 MOD. L. REV. 51, 55 (2018) (“[V]enture capitalists tend to be based in areas where there
are large ‘clusters’ of new firms, typically near a source of technological innovation such as a
university. But for an entrepreneur not living in, or able to relocate to, the vicinity of a
venture capitalist, this source of finance is unlikely to be available.” (footnote omitted)).
74 STANGLER ET AL., supra note 70, at 4 (“Among firms that received the full amount they
sought from angel investors, 30 percent were in . . . New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
and Boston.”).
75 Project Diane, which tracks statistics regarding access to VC funding by black women
founders, found that since 2009, startups led by black women raised a total of $289 million
in venture and angel funding, 0.068% of the total $424.7 billion in technology venture funding
raised in that time. ProjectDiane2018, The State of Black Women Founders,
DIGITALUNDIVIDED, http://projectdiane.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2021); see also ALGERNON
AUSTIN, CTR. FOR GLOB. POLICY SOLS., THE COLOR OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: WHY THE RACIAL
GAP AMONG FIRMS COSTS THE U.S. BILLIONS 20 (2016), http://globalpolicysolutions.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Color-of-Entrepreneurship-report-final.pdf (“Entrepreneurs of color
often lack access to the informal networks that are critical for attracting venture capitalists
to help support their business pursuits.”); Hurt, supra note 72, at 224 (“[A]lmost all startup
companies with VC funding were founded by men and led by men.”).
76 See, e.g., Kelly A. Porter, You Can’t Leave Your Past Behind: The Influence of Founders’
Career Histories on Their Firms (2004) (unpublished dissertation, Executive Summary,
Stanford University), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1371633 (“Where
entrepreneurs went to school, what they studied, where they worked previously and the types
of jobs they held, all influence the range of options available to their firms.”).
77 See Armour & Enriques, supra note 73, at 56 (“Where in the past geography would have
placed a constraint on the success of [crowdfunding], the internet means that a great deal of
information can now be conveyed to potential funders wherever they are located.” (footnote
omitted)).
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minorities are less likely than comparable white founders to
successfully raise capital through crowdfunding.78
Token sales share crowdfunding’s advantages but typically offer
more upside potential to investors.79 Ties to Silicon Valley or Wall
Street are not required for a successful ICO or IEO, potentially
allowing for greater geographic diversity in early-stage capital
formation. The research on racial disparities in crowdfunding offers
reason to be cautious about token sales’ potential to significantly
improve the racial and socio-economic diversity of founders who
receive early-stage funding.80 But untethering startup capital
formation from elite VC networks and casting a wider investor net
at least holds out the possibility of addressing these diversity issues.
There are signs that token sales can challenge the VC funding
model. A recent study showed that while VC investment in
blockchain-related firms is growing quickly, ICO funding for these
types of companies surpassed it in 2018.81 Some industry observers
caution that the VC funding model offers benefits beyond capital—
personal relationships, industry expertise, and other forms of nonmonetary support—that token sales cannot duplicate.82 Others
78 See Peter Younkin & Venkat Kuppuswamy, The Colorblind Crowd? Founder Race and
Performance in Crowdfunding, 64 MGMT. SCI. 3269, 3269 (2018) (surveying over 7000
crowdfunding projects and finding that “African American men are significantly less likely
than similar white founders to receive funding and that prospective supporters rate identical
projects as lower in quality when they believe the founder is an African American male”).
79 Crowdfunding generally is viewed less as an investment strategy and more as an
opportunity to support interesting projects or products. Many ICOs are considered
investment vehicles from which participants expect a return on their funds. See, e.g., Marco
Dell’Erba, Initial Coin Offerings: The Response of Regulatory Authorities, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. &
BUS. 1107, 1112 (2018) (“Unlike crowdfunding campaigns, ICOs are not donation, but more
generally [offer] a financial stake in the company, including the right to vote on future
decisions.” (footnotes omitted)).
80 See Younkin & Kuppuswamy, supra note 78, at 3269–70 (discussing discrimination in
crowdfunding markets).
81 Jason D. Rowley, ICOs Delivered at Least 3.5x More Capital to Blockchain Startups than
VC Since 2017, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Feb. 28, 2018), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/icosdelivered-least-3-5x-capital-blockchain-startups-vc-since-2017/ (“[D]espite over $900 million
in recorded venture funding in 2017, and over $375 million in known venture funding for the
first two months of 2018 so far, traditional VC rounds—convertible notes seed, angel, Series
A, Series B, etc.—now pale in comparison to ICOs in terms of dollar volume.”).
82 See, e.g., Travis Scher, Will Blockchains Disrupt Venture Capital?, DIGITAL CURRENCY
GROUP (May 8, 2017), https://insights.dcg.co/will-blockchains-disrupt-venture-capital9436f158f2f2 (“I doubt that VC [will] be disrupted and displaced by open blockchain. I don’t
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counter that, despite these advantages, blockchain-based funding
will significantly alter the VC ecosystem.83
When companies have grown sufficiently, they may decide to tap
into the public capital markets via an initial public offering. IPOs
often can raise much greater amounts of capital than typically is
possible through VC financing, making the IPO funding model more
difficult for token sales to displace.84 But not impossible. In recent
years, the median IPO raised in the neighborhood of $100 million.85
Several 2017 and 2018 ICOs raised more than $100 million.86
Increased SEC regulation of ICOs cooled the market in 2019,87 but
the potential for blockchain-based vehicles to raise public money
remains powerful. The number of IPOs (and public companies) has
fallen since the dotcom bubble burst in the early 2000s.88 Several
explanations for this trend have been proposed, including
regulatory burdens associated with going public, an increase in
companies acquired pre-IPO, less demand for smaller offerings, and
believe the crowd can replace experienced early-stage investors, who play the critical roles of
sorting, signaling, and, most critically, support.”).
83 See, e.g., Polina Marinova, Why This Venture Capitalist Wants Crypto to Disrupt His
Business, FORTUNE (Jan. 10, 2018, 9:27 AM), http://fortune.com/2018/01/10/crypto-disruptventure-capital/ (quoting venture capitalist David Pakman as stating that “[t]here’s no
question that crypto will disrupt the business of venture capital”).
84 See, e.g., Levon Ghonyan, Advantages and Disadvantages of Going Public and Becoming
a
Listed
Company
(June
29,
2017)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2995271 (going public can lead to “a
greater amount of funds being available through the public capital markets to help with
development and business growth”).
85 In 2019, the median IPO offering size was $107 million; it was $108 million in 2018, $120
million in 2017, and $94 million in 2016. See WILMERHALE, IPO REPORT 2 (2020),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/publications/2020-ipo-report.
86 The Bancor ICO raised $153 million in June 2017; EOS raised $185 million, also in June
2017; Filecoin raised $257 million in September 2017; Telegram, which conducted a private,
two-stage ICO, raised a total of $1.7 billion in February 2017 and April 2018. See The Biggest
Initial Coin Offerings We’ve Seen So Far, COIN INSIDER (May 16, 2018),
https://www.coininsider.com/top-five-biggest-initial-coin-offerings/.
87 See supra notes 40–41 & 68 and accompanying text.
88 There was a total of 4470 IPOs during the years 1990–2000, as compared to 1847 IPOs
in the period 2001–2017. See JAY R. RITTER, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: UPDATED STATISTICS
3 (2020), https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/IPOs2019Statistics.pdf. There were about
3600 public companies listed on U.S. exchanges at the end of 2017, “down more than half
from 1997.” Where Have All the Public Companies Gone?, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2018, 7:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-09/where-have-all-the-u-s-publiccompanies-gone.
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greater reliance on alternative private funding sources.89 Whatever
the cause, blockchain-based funding may exacerbate the decline.
2. Impact on Derivatives Trading. Derivatives are financial
contracts whose value is based on the performance or value of an
underlying financial instrument or asset, such as a mortgage,
commodity, interest rate, or currency.90 Common types of
derivatives include futures, options, interest-rate swaps, and credit
default swaps.91 The markets for financial derivatives are among
the largest and most important in the financial services sector.92
They are also hugely profitable for the big banks that control them.93
Before the 2007–08 financial crisis, derivatives markets were
largely unregulated.94 Many derivatives contracts were executed
bilaterally (over-the-counter or OTC), which resulted in firms
accumulating significant counterparty risk unbeknownst to

89 See e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Dearth of I.P.O.s, but It’s Not the Fault of Red Tape,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/business/deal
book/fewer-ipos-regulation-stock-market.html (describing various explanations for the
decline in IPOs); Robert P. Bartlett III, Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Small IPO
and the Investing Preferences of Mutual Funds, 47 J. CORP. FIN. 151, 151 (2017) (examining
“how liquidity and return concerns at large mutual funds explain their diminished
participation in small IPOs since the late 1990s”); Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan
Zhu, Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663, 1663 (2018)
(arguing that the advantages for smaller companies to sell to a larger firm have increased
relative to the benefits of operating independently, resulting in fewer small IPOs).
90 Frank D’Souza, Nan S. Ellis & Lisa M. Fairchild, Illuminating the Need for Regulation
in Dark Markets: Proposed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
473, 474 (2010).
91 Id. at 479.
92 In mid-2018, the notional value of derivatives worldwide was $595 trillion, while their
gross market value (the cost of replacing all existing derivatives contracts) was $10 trillion.
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT ENDJUNE 2018, at 2 (2018), https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1810.pdf. Notional value is the face
value of the contracts. Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1993,
2009 (1995). Gross market value “provides a more meaningful measure of amounts at risk”
than notional amounts. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra, at 2.
93 See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
1143, 1196 (2017) (describing over-the-counter derivatives trading as “an important source of
profitable business for financial institutions”).
94 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1a(47)(B)(i), 2(d) (2018) (exempting over-the-counter swaps from CFTC
oversight); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-1(b)(2) (2018) (exempting security-based swaps from SEC
oversight); D’Souza et al., supra note 90, at 492 (“[T]he bulk of derivatives remain
unregulated.”).
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regulators (and sometimes to the companies themselves).95 When
the bill came due on these trades, firms like AIG could not meet
their obligations, exacerbating the contagion caused by the housing
downturn.96
Because derivatives were widely seen as having worsened the
financial crisis, Congress targeted them for regulation in the 2010
Dodd–Frank Act.97 In some financial markets, like the public
equities markets, many trades are entered on public exchanges (the
New York Stock Exchange, for example) and then settled at
centralized clearinghouses.98 The primary goal of Dodd–Frank’s
derivatives title was to ensure that the vast majority of derivatives
trades would be centrally cleared and exchange traded, rather than
traded OTC.99 In this regulatory regime, well-capitalized central
95 See D’Souza et al., supra note 90, at 483, 490–91 (explaining that “OTC derivatives are
subject to significant counterparty (default) risk” and recounting the impact of this risk when
the housing market collapse in 2007 caused the huge markets for collateralized debt
obligations and credit default swaps to swoon).
96 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
AIG REMAINS IN TARP AS TARP’S LARGEST INVESTMENT 2–4 (2012), http://www.sigtarp.gov/
Audit%20Reports/AIG_Remains_in_TARP_Mini_Book.pdf (describing AIG’s collapse and
noting that “[o]fficials involved in the rescue maintained that if AIG went under, it would
have taken down other financial institutions and caused havoc around the world”).
97 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
98 See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge
of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 316–17 (1990)
(“Most of the trades in corporate equity and debt securities made on the major United States
securities exchanges and OTC markets are cleared and settled . . . in a system involving the
combined services of two registered clearing agencies . . . .”). Even in the equities markets,
many trades are now being made in so-called “dark pools” rather than on the public
exchanges. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1299
(2017) (“[M]ost equities in the United States, including those listed on the NASDAQ and the
New York Stock Exchange are traded in dark pools instead of the public exchanges.”).
99 See, e.g., Letter from Timothy F. Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, to Sen.
Harry Reid, U.S. Senate 1 (May 13, 2009), http://www.maths-fi.com/Timothy-Geithner-OTCletter-05132009.pdf (“To contain systemic risks, the [Commodity Exchange Act] and the
securities laws should be amended to require clearing of all standardized OTC derivatives
through regulated central counterparties (CCPs).”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
Regulatory
Reform
Over-the-Counter
(OTC)
Derivatives
(May
13,
2009),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg129.aspx
(stating
that
regulatory reform objectives for the OTC derivatives markets include that “[t]he Commodity
Exchange Act (CEA) and the securities laws should be amended to require clearing of all
standardized OTC derivatives through regulated central counterparties (CCP)” and that
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counterparty clearinghouses (CCPs) would take on the counterparty
risk of default inherent in derivatives trades, thereby reducing
systemic risk—at least, theoretically.100 Exchange trading would
lessen pricing opacity and lower bid-ask spreads.101 To this end,
Dodd–Frank mandated that most derivatives trades be centrally
cleared102 and that centrally cleared derivatives trades be executed
on exchanges.103
These reforms posed a challenge for Wall Street banks. OTC
trading was extremely profitable for them because it was an opaque
market where they benefitted from large bid-ask spreads.104
Exchange trading, where spreads are publicly available, would
threaten these profits by allowing customers to shop around for the
best deal on a trade, reducing or eliminating banks’
“standardized trades” be moved “onto regulated exchanges and regulated transparent
electronic trade execution systems”).
100 See Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for
Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153, 1175–76 (2012) (explaining that under
Dodd–Frank derivatives clearinghouses “use centralization to address the systemic risk
inherent in bilateral derivatives transactions” and “undertake[] all counterparty credit risk”).
101 See, e.g., In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014 WL
4379112, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014) (“[T]he prevention of exchange trading directly injured
[credit default swap] investors by sustaining the inflated bid/ask spreads they had to pay.”).
Bid-ask spreads are the difference between the price at which a dealer will buy an asset and
the price at which it will sell that asset. See id. at *1. The spread between these two prices is
the dealer’s profit. Id.
102 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
723(h), 124 Stat. 1376, 1675–76 (2010) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(1)(A) (2018))
(“It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in a swap unless that person submits such
swap for clearing to a derivatives clearing organization . . . .”). The Act contains parallel
requirements for securities-based swaps, which the SEC regulates under the Dodd–Frank
framework. See id. § 763, 124 Stat. at 1762 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(a)(1)
(2018)) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in a security-based swap unless that
person submits such security-based swap for clearing to a clearing agency. . . .”).
103 Id. § 723(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 1681 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(8)(A)) (“[S]waps
subject to [this] clearing requirement” must be executed “on a board of trade designated as a
contract market” or “on a swap execution facility.”). Again, the Act includes parallel
requirements for securities-based swaps. Id. § 763, 124 Stat. at 1767 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(h)(1)) (“With respect to transactions involving security-based swaps subject
to the clearing requirement . . . counterparties shall . . . execute the transaction on an
exchange; or . . . execute the transaction on a security-based swap execution facility . . . .”).
104 See, e.g., In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d 430, 444 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (stating that OTC selling of interest rate swaps “was advantageous to dealers” and
allowed for various practices that “tended to diminish price competition”).
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supracompetitive profits.105 Indeed, public exchanges threatened to
remove altogether the need for parties entering derivatives trades
to use the big banks’ services.106
Evidence suggests that the big banks have taken a number of
measures since Dodd–Frank’s passage to preserve their
supracompetitive profits on OTC derivatives trades by resisting the
move to central clearing and exchange trading. Plaintiffs in two
multidistrict litigation antitrust cases against the big banks alleged
a variety of anticompetitive acts aimed at preventing a shift to
exchange trading.107 These alleged acts included coordinating group
boycotts of emerging electronic exchanges, seizing control of
clearinghouses to prevent their use in enabling exchange trading,
and using that control to push certain types of derivatives trades to
the OTC markets.108 According to plaintiffs in one of these cases,
this conduct stemmed from the banks’ fear that “exchange
trading . . . threatened to slash the [banks’] margins by ‘billions of
dollars’ by disintermediating them.”109
Blockchain-based derivatives trading and (potentially) clearing
similarly threaten the big banks’ derivatives-trading profits.
Currently, most credit derivatives contracts are processed through
the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation’s (DTCC) Trade
Information Warehouse (TIW).110 DTCC and its partners in the

105 See, e.g., In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 4379112, at *8 (“[T]he
prevention of exchange trading directly injured [credit default swap] investors by sustaining
the inflated bid/ask spreads they had to pay.”).
106 See In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d at 475 (“All-to-all
exchange trading, however, threatened to slash the Dealers’ margins by ‘billions of dollars’
by disintermediating them.”).
107 See id. at 441 (stating that the plaintiffs alleged that big banks “conspired to boycott
and otherwise undermine” emergent “electronic exchange-based platforms for” interest rate
swaps trades); In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 4379112, at *3–4 (stating
that the plaintiffs alleged that big banks “conspired to shut . . . down” an emergent electronic
exchange platform for credit default swaps).
108 See, e.g., In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d at 442 (noting that
the banks allegedly engaged in “a boycott aimed at destroying” new electronic trading
platforms); In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 4379112, at *5 (describing
banks’ seizure of a clearinghouse).
109 In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d at 475.
110 “The [Trade Information] Warehouse provides lifecycle event processing services for
approximately 98% of all credit derivative transactions in the global marketplace.” Trade
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banking consortium R3 have announced plans to transition eleven
trillion dollars of credit derivatives to a blockchain-based system.111
The DTCC’s new distributed ledger will offer “peer nodes” to large
derivatives trading firms.112 Smaller firms can access the ledger
through DTCC’s node.113 This will be a permissioned network, so
traders will need approval to access the ledger.114 DTCC and its
partners believe the transition to blockchain-based derivatives
processing will increase transaction speeds and reduce costs.115 The
current system can take up to a week to settle a trade; blockchain
settlement theoretically will be instantaneous.116 Cost savings
likely will come in the form of reduced need for human trade
reconciliation.117 While the system’s rollout has been bumpier than
expected—reflecting
blockchain
technology’s
relative

Information Warehouse Learning Center, DTCC https://dtcclearning.com/products-andservices/trade-information-warehouse.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).
111 del Castillo, supra note 10.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Press Release, DTCC, DTCC Selects IBM, AXONI and R3 to Develop DTCC’s
Distributed
Ledger
Solution
for
Derivatives
Processing
(Jan.
9,
2017),
https://www.dtcc.com/news/2017/january/09/dtcc-selects-ibm-axoni-and-r3-to-develop-dtccsdistributed-ledger-solution (describing the project’s “end-state vision to establish a
permissioned distributed ledger network for derivatives”).
115 Id. (“The [blockchain] solution will enable DTCC and its clients to further streamline,
automate and reduce the cost of derivatives processing across the industry by eliminating the
need for disjointed, redundant processing capabilities and the associated reconciliation
costs.”).
116 del Castillo, supra note 10 (“[T]he existing settlement infrastructure . . . can take as long
as a week to close compared to the nearly instant settlement times expected from the
blockchain solution.”).
117 See Press Release, DTCC, supra note 114 (“By recording and automatically managing
shared records of financial agreements in the cloud without error, [the distributed ledger] can
minimize the steps required for post-trade processing and free up middle and back office staff
from the onerous task of reconciliation.”). A 2015 study by Santander InnoVentures estimated
that “distributed ledger technology could reduce banks’ infrastructure costs attributable to
cross-border payments, securities trading and regulatory compliance by between $15–20
billion per annum by 2022.” SANTANDER INNOVENTURES, OLIVER WYMAN & ANTHEMIS GRP.,
THE FINTECH 2.0 PAPER: REBOOTING FINANCIAL SERVICES 15 (2015) (footnote omitted),
https://www.finextra.com/finextra-downloads/newsdocs/the%20fintech%202%200%20paper.
pdf.
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immaturity118—DTCC expects its commercial launch in the near
future.119
DTCC’s move to blockchain technology is potentially significant,
but blockchain offers the possibility of more fundamentally altering
the derivatives markets by eliminating the need for big banks’
participation altogether, at least for portions of the derivativestrading lifecycle. A public, permissionless, blockchain-based
derivatives trading and clearing system theoretically could allow
anyone to trade and clear derivatives without needing access to
DTCC’s permissioned network or availing themselves of the big
banks’ trading and clearing services.120
Employing a public distributed ledger, users could offer
derivatives in the form of smart contracts. Buyers and sellers would
enter their bids and asks directly onto the blockchain through their
own terminals. A separate ledger could be used to manage
collateral,121 and traditional derivatives dealers and exchanges no
longer would be needed. Blockchain could validate Nick Szabo’s
prediction that “[i]n a few years teenagers in Indiana will be
swapping over-the-blockchain derivatives with grandmas in India
without asking New York City.”122

118 See Michael del Castillo, Enterprises Building Blockchain Confront Early Tech
Limitations, COINDESK (Mar. 23, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/enterprisesbuilding-blockchain-confront-tech-limitations (commenting on blockchain’s limitations and
barriers to its expansion).
119 See Press Release, DTCC, DTCC Enters Test Phase on Distributed Ledger Project for
Credit Derivatives with MarkitSERV & 15 Leading Global Banks (Nov. 6, 2018),
http://www.dtcc.com/news/2018/november/06/dtcc-enters-test-phase-on-distributed-ledgerproject-for-credit-derivatives-with-markitserv (“Testing is anticipated to be completed by Q1
2019 with go live scheduled thereafter.”).
120 See, e.g., Dan Awrey, Split Derivatives: Inside the World’s Most Misunderstood Contract,
36 YALE J. REG. 495, 565 (2019) (noting that combining distributed ledgers with smart
contracts could create the conditions for undertaking financial transactions “without the
involvement of conventional financial intermediaries”).
121 ISDA, ISDA WHITEPAPER: THE FUTURE OF DERIVATIVES PROCESSING AND MARKET
INFRASTRUCTURE 23 (2016), https://www.isda.org/a/UEKDE/infrastructure-white-paper.pdf
(“It may be that related parts of a derivatives process exist on different ledgers—for example,
collateral management may exist on one ledger and trade performance on another.”).
122 Nick
Szabo
(@NickSzabo4),
TWITTER
(Dec.
21,
2016,
9:06
PM),
https://twitter.com/nickszabo4/status/811754664983044096?.
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Several blockchain-based derivatives exchanges are in
development.123 In mid-2018, Level01 launched a blockchain-based,
peer-to-peer derivatives exchange for trading options.124 The
company partnered with Thomson Reuters, which provides the data
necessary for pricing the derivative contracts.125 Level01 asserted
that its exchange will allow peer-to-peer trading in a range of
instruments—including
stocks,
foreign
exchange,
and
commodities—“without a need for an intermediary broker.”126
Central counterparty clearinghouses (CCPs) may be more
difficult to replace in the derivatives markets. In an equities
transaction, a distributed ledger can determine at the time of the
trade whether both parties own the relevant assets.127 In many

123 EverMarkets has announced plans to launch the EverMarkets Exchange, a futures
exchange and clearing platform supporting peer-to-peer trading for both traditional and
crypto derivatives. See Annaliese Milano, Startup EverMarkets Aims to Shake up Futures
(Mar.
21,
2018,
3:05
PM),
Trading
with
Blockchain,
COINDESK
https://www.coindesk.com/wall-street-vets-target-crypto-futures-evermarkets-launch
(describing the announcement of EverMarkets’ blockchain-based trading platform and
quoting the firm’s CEO as stating that the platform’s goal is to “disintermediate some of these
centralized players and allow for a peer-to-peer trading of futures.”). Similarly, eToro has
developed a blockchain-based derivatives trading platform. See Daniel Kuhn, eToro Aims to
Put Derivatives on the Blockchain with Lira Programming Language, COINDESK (Sept. 15,
2019, 3:09 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/etoro-aims-to-put-derivatives-on-the-blockchainwith-lira-programming-language (describing eToro’s “demo” derivatives trading platform).
For a comparison of several blockchain-based crypto derivatives exchanges and a discussion
of the benefits of using derivatives, see Ashwath Balakrishnan, The Best Crypto Derivative
Exchanges, CRYPTOBRIEFING (Apr. 5, 2020), https://cryptobriefing.com/best-cryptoderivative-exchanges/.
124 Soft Launch in Hong Kong, supra note 7 (announcing the platform’s launch).
125 See Cryptovest: Blockchain Platform Eliminates Brokers in Derivatives Trading,
LEVEL01 (Sept. 25, 2018), https://level01.io/2018/09/25/blockchain-platform-eliminatesbrokers-in-derivatives-trading/ (“Under the deal, Level 01 will use data feeds from Thomson
Reuters as the primary source for its artificial intelligence (AI) deep learning algorithms to
enable the platform to provide real-time pricing analysis on derivative contracts.”).
126 See LEVEL01, supra note 33, at abstract.
127 The SEC recently approved a pilot project for Paxos, a blockchain startup, to begin
settling certain equities trades without having to register with the SEC as a clearing agency.
See Letter from Jeffrey S. Mooney, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Trading & Mkts., U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, to Charles G. Cascarilla & Daniel M. Burstein, Paxos Tr. Co. 2–3 (Oct. 28, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/2019/paxos-trust-company-10281917a.pdf. The Paxos blockchain “would let banks exchange digital representations of cash and
securities to settle trades with each other.” Osipovich, supra note 32. A similar technology
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derivatives contracts, by contrast, the question is whether the
parties will have sufficient assets sometime in the future.128
Existing CCPs are designed to handle this future counterparty risk
because they (theoretically) have sufficient capital to guarantee that
any derivative contract they back can be satisfied.129 Nonetheless,
some blockchain proponents assert that the technology can
eliminate the need for derivatives CCPs, too.130 Whether distributed
clearing can replace CCPs remains an open question, which may be
answered as the technology develops.131
Central clearing generally is required only for standardized
derivatives contracts, however.132 Bespoke derivatives will continue
to be traded OTC.133 Some argue that blockchain can serve the
clearing function for OTC derivatives via a decentralized clearing
network.134 One startup, SynSwap, claims that its blockchain-based
system can offer “distributed clearing” for OTC derivatives, which

could be used to clear trades. Id. (stating that proponents of the Paxos project say it “offers a
blueprint for a next-generation approach to clearing and settlement”).
128 See Griffith, supra note 100, at 1158, 1161 (explaining that in derivatives contracts,
counterparties “commit to one or several payments at some time in the future,” creating
counterparty credit risk that a party “will fail to perform its obligations under the contract”
because they become insolvent).
129 Id. at 1176 (“[T]he clearinghouse effectively undertakes all counterparty credit risk
while the transacting parties have zero exposure to their original counterparties and, as long
as the clearinghouse remains solvent, no exposure to counterparty credit risk.”).
130 See, e.g., Hogan Lovells, A Look at How Blockchain Could Redefine the Structure of the
Capital Markets, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
018fe6ae-6c4d-4638-8d6a-4ffc097b9fdc (“[B]lockchain and other distributed ledger
technologies (DLTs) have the potential to decentralize the system and eliminate the need . . .
for CCPs . . . .”).
131 See Surujnath, supra note 22, at 281 (“There is some disagreement among industry
stakeholders as to the degree to which blockchains can displace CCPs as intermediaries in
derivatives trades.”).
132 See Griffith, supra note 100, at 1196–97 (“The key factors in deciding whether a
particular instrument must be cleared are liquidity and the ability to reliably price the
instrument—both of which come down to, essentially, the standardization of a particular
instrument.”).
133 See id. at 1197 (noting that dealers desiring to trade derivatives OTC will try to make
the derivatives seem “highly customized and therefore not eligible for clearing”).
134 See About, SYNSWAP, https://www.f6s.com/synswap (last visited Feb. 9, 2021) (describing
Synswap, a startup using “blockchain technology to build a platform providing post-trade
services for OTC derivatives,” including clearing).
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will “disintermediate CCPs.”135 This service is touted as providing
the same netting processes, reduction in counterparty risk, and
management of defaults as a CCP, without the systemic risks CCPs
may pose.136
A shift to blockchain-based derivatives trading platforms and
clearinghouses may significantly alter the competitive and
regulatory landscape of the derivatives markets. Before Dodd–
Frank required standardized derivatives to be exchange-traded and
centrally cleared, derivatives pricing typically was opaque.137 This
pricing opacity limited competition and allowed big banks to make
supracompetitive profits on derivatives trades via large bid-ask
spreads.138 The move to exchange trading that Dodd–Frank
required promised to reduce some of this opacity and lower
spreads.139 Trading OTC derivatives on a public blockchain would
further decrease pricing opacity and make the OTC derivatives
markets more competitive. Indeed, a public, blockchain-based

See Joe Parsons, Blockchain Startup Aims to Replace Clearing Houses, TRADE (Oct. 11,
2016, 5:54 AM), https://www.thetradenews.com/blockchain-startup-aims-to-replace-clearinghouses/.
136 Id.
137 See, e.g., D’Souza et al., supra note 90, at 505 (noting the argument that the “lack of
transparency in today’s derivatives markets” contributed to the global financial crisis and
that, “along with the complexity of the instruments used, [it] led to a level of opaqueness that
‘created huge information asymmetries and failures’ and prevented the market from being
able to effectively price and monitor derivatives” (footnote omitted) (quoting Aaron
Unterman, Innovative Destruction—Structured Finance and Credit Market Reform in the
Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53, 87 (2009))).
138 See, e.g., In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014 WL
4379112, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014) (“[T]he prevention of exchange trading directly injured
[credit default swap] investors by sustaining the inflated bid/ask spreads they had to pay. No
intermediaries stood between plaintiffs, who paid the supracompetitive prices, and Dealer–
Defendants, who pocketed them as a result of their efforts to keep CMDX and other nascent
[exchanges] out of the market.”).
139 See, e.g., Letter from Timothy F. Geithner to Harry Reid, supra note 99, at 2 (“Market
efficiency and price transparency should be improved in derivatives markets by requiring the
clearing of standardized contracts through regulated CCPs . . . and by moving the
standardized part of these markets onto regulated exchanges and regulated transparent
electronic trade execution systems for OTC derivatives and by requiring development of a
system for timely reporting of trades and prompt dissemination of prices and other trade
information.”).
135
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derivatives exchange could remove the need for derivatives dealers
altogether, making trading cheaper.140
Blockchain-based trading and clearing also offer the possibility
of increased regulatory visibility into the derivatives markets.141
Regulators could have their own nodes on these blockchains, giving
them access to the full distributed ledger, including complete
information about every transaction recorded on that ledger.142 This
technology would be more efficient for regulators than the current
system where the agencies must work with bank personnel to
retrieve relevant records.143 Further, accessing selected trade
information allows regulators to see only a snapshot of the market
at any one time; blockchain can give them a holistic understanding
of the entire market.144 Agencies also could see margin information
and better understand which firms and transactions might pose
systemic risk. Dan Bucsa, Deputy Director in the CFTC’s Division
of Market Oversight, has observed that distributed ledger

140 See Surujnath, supra note 22, at 280 (“In OTC markets, dealers could play a reduced
role. Rather than relying on the dealers to match bids and asks, parties could take advantage
of the anonymity provided by the blockchain . . . . They could upload asks directly to the
blockchain and rely on its computing to automatically choose the highest bid.” (footnote
omitted)); OLIVER WYMAN & EUROCLEAR, BLOCKCHAIN IN CAPITAL MARKETS: THE PRIZE AND
THE
JOURNEY
12
(2016),
https://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliverwyman/global/en/2016/feb/BlockChain-In-Capital-Markets.pdf (“Many clients (particularly
on the buy side) will expect to accrue the most benefit, from the reduction in costs of capital
markets dealing and securities servicing. Retail and wholesale investors may transact more
among themselves, now with guaranteed execution on open markets.”).
141 See Awrey, supra note 120, at 565–66 (noting that blockchain-based derivatives trading
can “provide regulatory authorities with a more complete and accurate picture of market
structure and activity, thereby improving both microprudential and macroprudential
oversight whilst simultaneously reducing the regulatory reporting burden on individual
counterparties and [swap data repositories]”).
142 del Castillo, supra note 10 (“Since the distributed ledger’s record is immutable, a
regulatory node has the potential to give government observers access to real-time data about
transactions, instead of having to wait for reports from market participants.”).
143 See CFTC TAC MEETING, supra note 1, at 55 (statement of Dan Bucsa) (asserting that
blockchain “could allow regulators to access data automatically and seamlessly . . . every time
a trade is executed or posted on a particular blockchain without the need for human
intervention or the use of intermediaries”).
144 See id. at 57 (“Agencies would no longer be privy to only a sliver of a firms’ activities, or
subject to delays based on snapshots in time. Instead, every U.S. financial regulator . . . would
have immediate access to all the data available on the blockchain and be allowed to make
fully informed decision based upon a holistic view.”).
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technology offers regulators numerous advantages, including more
efficient data access and “near real time” market oversight.145
This regulatory benefit is potentially limited, however. First, it
is unclear whether participants will allow their data to be shared
with regulators. The CEO of DTCC’s derivatives-trading subsidiary
cautioned that disclosure is not mandatory, and firms may be
reluctant to divulge such data to the agencies.146 Second, regulators
may find there is simply too much data to usefully assimilate. Both
the CFTC and SEC are understaffed, especially considering the size
and importance of the markets they oversee.147 Asking them to
dedicate personnel to analyze the firehose of information that
regulatory nodes would produce may overtax the agencies. The
CFTC’s Dan Bucsa noted other unknowns about relying on
blockchains for regulatory reporting, including the role of
standardization, which he argued will be necessary for regulators to
acquire and analyze data.148 Nonetheless, both Bucsa and SEC
leadership have expressed optimism that blockchain-based
advances in financial-services technology will aid regulators by

Id. at 55–56.
del Castillo, supra note 10 (“Opening up the fire hose of data to government controllers
[the DTCC official] said, may not be so appealing to all involved. ‘Clearly the capability of
[regulators] being established as a node on the network exists with blockchain . . . . But it’s
still very much to be determined.’”). Brian Knight, Director of Innovation and Governance
and Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center of George Mason University, stated at a
meeting of the CFTC’s Technology Advisory Committee that “we don’t [want] a world where
the regulator is like a vampire, and once you let them into your house, you’re powerless to
stop them.” CFTC TAC MEETING, supra note 1, at 68.
147 See, e.g., Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Remarks
before the International Group of Treasury Associations and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
(Sept. 27, 2013), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-146 (“[T]he
CFTC is currently an underfunded agency. . . . We are far short of the people we need to
oversee our new mandate, the swaps market . . . .”); Sam Knight, With Washington Closely
Eyeing Stock Prices, SEC Chair Bemoans Staff Shortages, THE DISTRICT SENTINEL (Feb. 6,
2018),
https://www.districtsentinel.com/washington-closely-eyeing-stock-prices-sec-chairbemoans-staff-shortages/ (reporting that SEC Chairman Clayton told members of the Senate
Banking Committee that “[p]ersonnel is my biggest challenge at the moment” and “I could
use more people in enforcement. I could use more people in trading and markets.”).
148 CFTC TAC MEETING, supra note 1, at 59–61. Bucsa argued that these unknowns should
“temper[] enthusiasm that regulatory reporting via DLT is both a definitive and near term
deliverable.” Id. at 59.
145
146
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offering them increased intelligence about the markets they
oversee.149
3. What is at Risk for Financial Institutions? Determining exactly
how financial institutions make their money is notoriously
difficult.150 But clearly, a significant amount of the revenue Wall
Street firms generate comes from sales and trading of financial
instruments, deal-making, and providing financing.151 To various
degrees, blockchain technology could threaten each of these income
streams. The opportunity for individuals and firms to trade
derivatives and equities directly via blockchains not controlled by
the big banks could potentially reduce Wall Street firms’ sales and
trading revenues. The measures banks have taken to avoid losing
this business—some of which have resulted in government
investigations, expensive lawsuits, and pricey settlements—are a
testament to their concern.152 Similarly, companies’ ability to raise
money through token sales threatens the traditional IPO model of
See Jay Clayton, Chairman’s Testimony on Virtual Currencies: The Roles of the SEC and
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N
(Feb.
6,
2018),
CFTC,
U.S.
https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-virtual-currencies-oversight-role-ussecurities-and-exchange-commission (“From a financial regulatory perspective, [advances in
financial technology] may enable us to better monitor transactions, holdings and obligations
(including credit exposures) and other activities and characteristics of our markets, thereby
facilitating our regulatory mission, including, importantly, investor protection.”); CFTC TAC
MEETING, supra note 1, at 55–56 (statement of Dan Bucsa) (observing that distributed ledger
technology offers regulators “near real time oversight of markets”).
150 See, e.g., Peter Eavis, Making Sense of Wall Street’s Trading Revenue, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Jan. 25, 2013, 10:12 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/makingsense-of-wall-streets-trading-revenue/ (quoting hedge fund founder Paul Singer as stating,
“[t]he major financial institutions in the U.S. and around the globe are utterly opaque”); How
the Four Biggest US Banks Generate Income and Revenue, MX (July 14, 2020),
https://www.mx.com/moneysummit/top-us-retail-banks-income-revenue (“[R]eporting the
success of single service lines [at the biggest banks] . . . has become more difficult to
dissect. . . . Annual reports and SEC disclosures provide some basic insights even though
specifics are opaque.”).
151 See Eavis, supra note 150 (“At large banks, sales and trading is a major source of
revenue, often dwarfing the fees that they earn from arranging deals or managing other
people’s money.”).
152 See, e.g., In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2017);
In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014 WL 4379112
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014). Both these cases involved allegations that the big banks conspired
to quash competition in trading derivatives. The banks settled the Credit Default Swaps case
for $2 billion. In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2016 WL
2731524, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2016).
149
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capital formation, which is lucrative for Wall Street firms.153 It also
puts pressure on the VC ecosystem, currently a standard forum for
early-stage funding.154 It is safe to say that billions of dollars of
annual profits are at risk of loss to Wall Street and VC firms should
blockchain-based financial services disintermediate these
established institutions.
Such a shift in the financial-services industry could have broad
societal consequences. The past few decades have been marked by
financialization of the economy: both the scale and profitability of
finance have increased relative to other economic activity.155 One
symptom of this development is the outsized profits financial
institutions enjoy: in 2013, finance accounted for nearly thirty
percent of all corporate profits (a bigger share than manufacturing),
but only around five percent of all employment in the United
States.156 This financialization process seemingly has contributed to
a number of societal problems, including income inequality.157
Increased competition in financial services from emergent
blockchain-based networks potentially could reverse some of these
PETER KOSLOWSKI, THE ETHICS OF BANKING: CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
162 (Deborah Shannon trans., 2009) (“[T]he IPO business, which was especially lucrative for
the investment banks and accounted for the bulk of their profits, is concentrated in the hands
of very few investment banks.”); John L. Orcutt, Investor Skepticism v. Investor Confidence:
Why the New Research Analyst Reforms Will Harm Investors, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 16–17
(2003) (“Winning IPO business is very important to the revenues of an investment bank
because of both the size of the possible underwriting fees for the IPO, and because being part
of the IPO can be critical to having an opportunity to access later follow-on offering and
financial advisory fees.”).
154 See supra Section II.B.1.
155 See Lin & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 36, at 1286 (“It is well established that, in the
past three decades, the United States has undergone a fundamental transformation from a
manufacture-driven to a finance-orientated economy, during which increased income shares
accrue through financial channels . . . .”); Thomas I. Palley, Financialization: What It Is and
Why It Matters 2 (The Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 525, 2007),
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_525.pdf (“Financialization is a process whereby
financial markets, financial institutions, and financial elites gain greater influence over
economic policy and economic outcomes.”). Financialization is “most developed” in the U.S.
economy. Id. at 3.
156 Jordan Weissmann, How Wall Street Devoured Corporate America, THE ATLANTIC (Mar.
5, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/03/how-wall-street-devouredcorporate-america/273732/.
157 See Lin & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 36, at 1285 (“[F]inancialization [is] a critical
institutional mechanism encouraging the post-1970s surge in U.S. income inequality.”).
153
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trends.158 Such competition should make access to these services
cheaper and more widely available.159 This competition also could
reduce the power Wall Street currently holds. In 2013, thenAttorney General Eric Holder suggested that the largest financial
institutions are so big they are above the law:
I am concerned that the size of some of these
institutions becomes so large that it does become
difficult for us to prosecute them when we are hit with
indications that if . . . [we] do bring a criminal charge, it
will have a negative impact on the national economy,
perhaps even the world economy, and I think that is a
function of the fact that some of these institutions have
become too large.160
If blockchain-based competition can cut into Wall Street’s profits
and deconcentrate the financial sector, the big banks’ aura of
invincibility may be pierced, potentially subjecting them to
increased criminal and civil sanctions. In any event, to the extent
peer-to-peer financial services, powered by blockchain, reduce
reliance on financial intermediaries, the current era of enormous
profits for Wall Street and Silicon Valley VCs could be nearing an
end.

III. BLOCKCHAIN & ANTITRUST
Large financial institutions will not allow these transformations
to occur without a fight, however. To ensure that fight is fair,
antitrust authorities and regulators must consider how best to
shape antitrust enforcement and competition policy for blockchain
technologies. Much of the competition-related scholarship on
blockchain has focused on the technology’s potential impact on

158 See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65
UCLA L. REV. 232, 252–53 (2018) (arguing that blockchain “presents a potential mechanism
for removing inefficient intermediaries” in financial services markets).
159 Id. at 255 (explaining that financial innovation, led by fintech firms, has “the potential
to reduce financial inequality”).
160 Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 43 (2013) (statement of Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. of the United States).
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antitrust risks and enforcement, and the bulk of that literature has
sounded dire warnings about blockchain’s anticompetitive potential
and the possibility that it will enable cartel members to escape
prosecution.161 These concerns are premature.
Blockchain’s primary effect in the antitrust arena may be to
facilitate collusion.162 As a general matter, distributed ledgers make
sharing information among participants easier. When that sharing
includes competitively sensitive data, such as pricing information,
firms may be able to use blockchains to form and maintain pricefixing cartels. Some have suggested that blockchains, combined
with the Internet of Things and artificial intelligence, could serve to
monitor adherence to a cartel agreement (for example by measuring
and reporting production volumes) and automatically punish
defectors through smart contracts.163 Even without explicit collusive
agreements,
blockchain’s
enhanced
information-sharing
capabilities might facilitate tacit collusion among participants.164

161 See, e.g., Schrepel, supra note 24, at 335 (“In the face of blockchain, current antitrust
law may well be eliminated.”); Thibault Schrepel, Collusion by Blockchain and Smart
Contracts, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH 117, 153 (2019) (“In short, mostly for technical reasons,
blockchain greatly complicates the work of antitrust and competition agencies.”).
162 See, e.g., Breu, supra note 24, at 6 (stating that using blockchain to “exchange . . .
current and future pricing of a product or other similar competitively sensitive information
could rapidly be deemed price fixing”); Izabella Kaminska, Exposing the “If We Call It a
Blockchain, Perhaps It Won’t be Deemed a Cartel?” Tactic, FIN. TIMES: ALPHAVILLE (May 11,
2015, 12:59 PM), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/05/11/2128849/exposing-the-if-we-call-it-ablockchain-perhaps-it-wont-be-deemed-a-cartel-tactic/ (“Why are the great and the good of
the banking and financial services world suddenly extolling the virtues of blockchain . . . ?
Possibly because they’ve finally figured out that what the technology really facilitates is cartel
management for groups that don’t trust each other but which still need to work together if
they’re to protect the value and stability of the markets they serve.”); David C. Kully & Josias
N. Dewey, Blockchain Collaborators Should Be Attuned to Potential Antitrust Issues,
THOMSON
REUTERS:
CORP.
COUNSEL
CONNECT
(Mar.
2017),
https://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/news-views/corporate-counsel/block
chain-collaborators-attuned-to-potential-antitrust (“[Blockchain] likely does provide another
vehicle that members of a price-fixing cartel could employ to establish industrywide prices
and ensure that members adhere to any agreement.”).
163 Deng, supra note 24, at 5 (“If the AI detects any deviation from the cartel agreement, it
could trigger an automatic retaliatory response codified in the smart contract.”).
164 Cong & He, supra note 21, at 4 (arguing that the decentralized consensus generated on
blockchains leads to participants’ attaining “greater knowledge of aggregate business
condition on the blockchain, which . . . can foster tacit collusion among sellers”).
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Another antitrust harm that might arise from blockchain use is
anticompetitive access denial to permissioned ledgers. In the case of
DTCC’s blockchain-based, derivatives-processing network, for
example, participating big banks potentially could disadvantage
derivatives-dealing rivals by excluding them from the ledger.165
Price-fixing cartels and denial of access to competitively
necessary facilities fall squarely within the ambit of standard
antitrust theory and enforcement practice. The Antitrust Division
of the U.S. Department of Justice is equipped to root out price-fixing
conspiracies in a range of technological settings. In 2015, the
Division prosecuted participants in a cartel that relied on
algorithms to fix prices for posters sold on the Amazon
Marketplace.166 While the technology this cartel employed was
different than that used in the proverbial smoke-filled rooms of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Division and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation were capable of uncovering the scheme and
prosecuting the participants.167 The Division’s prosecutorial tools
should prove as effective in the blockchain setting as in any other
context. This is especially true of the Leniency Program, under
which the Division grants prosecutorial immunity to cartel
members who are first-in-the-door to report cartel activity and
cooperate in the subsequent investigation.168 This program is the
Division’s most effective criminal enforcement tool and it should
operate equally well in prosecuting blockchain cartels as it does in
more traditional industries.169

165 See Kully & Dewey, supra note 162 (“Use of a shared ledger as a settlement and
clearance platform by financial services companies, for instance, could yield such significant
benefits that excluded firms might raise objections.”).
166 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former E-Commerce Exec. Charged with Price
Fixing in the Antitrust Div.’s First Online Marketplace Prosecution (Apr. 6, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-e-commerce-executive-charged-price-fixing-antitrustdivisions-first-online-marketplace.
167 Id.
168 Leniency Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/leniency-program
(last updated Feb. 20, 2020).
169 Id. (stating that the Leniency Program is the Division’s “most important investigative
tool for detecting cartel activity”). But see Schrepel, supra note 161, at 163 (arguing that the
“number of leniency applications may . . . drop because blockchain will reinforce trust during
the lifetime of collusive agreements”).
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Denial of access to nodes on a clearinghouse blockchain would
also represent an old story in a new technological setting. Indeed,
accusations against big banks of anticompetitive access denial to
clearing services pre-date the transition to blockchain. Plaintiffs in
In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litigation settled, for $2
billion, their claims that big banks used their positions on
clearinghouse risk committees to refuse access to dealer rivals in a
fashion that harmed competition.170 These types of “essential
facilities” or refusal-to-deal cases can be difficult for plaintiffs to
win, but the theory of harm is familiar, regardless of the
technological context.171
The same enhanced information-sharing and immutable recordkeeping that might appeal to price-fixing cartels also could make
blockchain-related antitrust enforcement more effective. A leniency
applicant may give enforcers access to a permissioned blockchain,
allowing them to observe the entire history and ongoing operation
of a price-fixing cartel, an advantage difficult to duplicate without
the blockchain.172 Blockchains’ ability to accurately preserve and
offer easy access to data could reduce the burden of data collection
and analysis in both merger and civil non-merger investigations.173
170 In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2016 WL 2731524, at
*1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2016).
171 Schrepel, supra note 24, at 309–12 (describing refusal to deal claims in the blockchain
setting). Professor Thibault Schrepel, however, argues that blockchain poses certain new
problems for antitrust enforcement, especially regarding determining relevant markets and
attributing liability, due to blockchain’s decentralized nature. Id. at 301–02.
172 Ajinkya M. Tulpule, Enforcement and Compliance in a Blockchain(ed) World, 1 CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON., Jan. 2017, at 4, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2906465 (“Using blockchain
technology, leniency applicants will be able to provide access to a live data stream on all
relevant transactions falling within the alleged cartel arrangement.”); see also Robinson,
supra note 29 (“The public image of bitcoin, cultivated by the media, is of the international
criminal’s currency of choice—an anonymous, untraceable means of laundering proceeds of
crime. . . . [B]ut the opposite is true. Bitcoin is in fact the most transparent payment method
ever developed, and has the potential to become a powerful tool in the fight against financial
crime.”).
173 Tulpule, supra note 172, at 3–5 (discussing blockchains’ utility in competition
enforcement, including merger control, cartel investigations, and monitoring commitments);
see also OECD BLOCKCHAIN AND COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 6 (arguing that granting
competition agencies access to blockchains “might enable them to monitor trading prices in
real-time, spot suspicious trends, and, when investigating a merger, conduct or market have
immediate access to the necessary data without needing to impose burdensome information
requests on parties”).
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Regulatory nodes on blockchains might allow agencies to detect
anticompetitive conduct in real time.
Blockchain technology does present certain non-antitrustspecific challenges to the legal system that antitrust enforcers and
plaintiffs may have to contend with. Blockchain users sometimes
protect their identities using pseudonyms, which may make
identifying them for purposes of legal sanctions difficult. So far, this
issue is more theoretical than practical, as researchers have
demonstrated that most blockchain users’ identities can be
uncovered,174 and prosecutors have successfully linked individual
defendants to blockchain transactions. A high-profile example of
law enforcement’s ability to pierce blockchain pseudonymity took
place in the trial of Ross Ulbricht, who was accused of controlling
Silk Road, an online bazaar offering drugs and various illegal
services.175 Prosecutors produced evidence of transactions between
bitcoin addresses in Silk Road’s digital wallet and Ross Ulbricht’s
digital wallet, which the FBI found on his seized laptop.176 Ulbricht
was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for operating Silk
Road.177 Further, in what appears to be among the earliest antitrust
cases filed in the blockchain space, a plaintiff was able to identify
the defendants, who are individuals and business entities.178
Undoubtedly, blockchain designers will continue to strive toward

174 See, e.g., Steven Goldfeder, Harry Kalodner, Dillon Reisman & Arvind Narayanan,
When the Cookie Meets the Blockchain: Privacy Risks of Web Payments via Cryptocurrencies,
PROC. ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHS., Oct. 2018, at 179 (showing “how third-party web
trackers can deanonymize users of cryptocurrencies”).
175 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ross Ulbricht, A/K/A “Dread Pirate Roberts,”
Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to Life in Prison (May 29, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/ross-ulbricht-aka-dread-pirate-roberts-sentencedmanhattan-federal-court-life-prison (describing Ulbricht’s prosecution and sentencing).
176 See Robinson, supra note 29 (“[An FBI agent] simply searched the bitcoin blockchain for
transactions involving the bitcoin addresses found in the Silk Road wallet and those on Ross
Ulbricht’s laptop – and bingo, he found direct transactions between them.”).
177 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 175.
178 Complaint at 2–3, United Am. Corp. v. Bitmain, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-25106-KMW (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 6, 2018) (identifying the defendants). Plaintiffs in this case allege that defendants
conspired to use “significant computing hashing power” to “dominat[e] [a] Bitcoin Cash . . .
software chain implementation.” Id. at 10.
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true anonymity for users, but to date this threat appears
overblown.179
Another general enforcement challenge blockchain poses stems
from its decentralized nature, which could make it tricky to
effectively remedy unlawful conduct undertaken on these networks.
Enforcing injunctions against an organization controlled by a
disparate group of pseudonymous users may be difficult. Professor
Thibault Schrepel warns that some blockchain networks will
continue to operate even if governments sanction their
developers.180 This is not a substantive antitrust issue, but it may
vex antitrust enforcers and plaintiffs who win judgments against
blockchain networks. However, remedies, including injunctions,
could be enforced against users, whose identities are not
anonymous. Further, these problems will not necessarily arise in all
or even in most blockchain-related antitrust cases.
There are reasons to believe that the antitrust laws are being
underenforced generally, but that trend is broader than and
separate from the growth of technology markets. As an enforcement
matter, the antitrust laws have proved adaptable to technological
change in the computer and Internet eras, and that flexibility
should continue in the blockchain era.181 The straightforward
nature of the antitrust claims likely to arise out of blockchain
networks reinforces this intuition.

IV. BLOCKCHAIN COMPETITION POLICY
While a limited body of scholarship addresses blockchain’s
implications for antitrust law and enforcement,182 even less has
See Schrepel, supra note 24, at 323 (noting that “[t]here is every reason to believe that
technology will move faster than regulators or authorities” to protect anonymity of blockchain
users).
180 Id. at 324 (noting that Augur, a blockchain-based “‘prediction market platform,’ has no
central party that can stop its operation”).
181 But see, e.g., Josh Obear, Move Last and Take Things: Facebook and Predatory Copying,
2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 994, 1001 (“There is a growing body of scholarship criticizing
current antitrust doctrine’s failure to ‘capture the architecture of market power in the twentyfirst century marketplace,’ especially for tech companies and Internet platform
intermediaries.” (quoting Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J.
710, 716 (2017))).
182 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
179
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been written on the broader competition-policy challenges
blockchain networks pose. Like the Internet in the 1990s,
blockchain is an incipient technology with the potential to upend a
variety of established markets. Sector regulators will be tasked with
establishing the ground rules for managing blockchain’s
competitive impact. Agencies charged with developing blockchainrelated competition policy will confront at least three key
challenges: (1) balancing the benefits of the increased competition
blockchain networks will make possible against concerns for
marketplace and consumer safety; (2) determining how much
market decentralization to promote or tolerate; and (3) deciding
whether and how to promote standardization, open-access, and nondiscrimination requirements for blockchain networks. This Part
analyzes the goals of blockchain competition policy, proposes a
framework for addressing these three key challenges, and evaluates
the capabilities of the institutions that will be responsible for
implementing these policy choices.
A. GOALS

Making effective blockchain competition policy requires
identifying the desired outcomes. Antitrust policy generally seeks to
remove obstacles to competition with the goal of higher output and
lower prices for consumers.183 Proponents of antitrust enforcement
argue that reducing anticompetitive conduct and concentrations of
market power also tends to increase innovation and consumer
choice.184 Competition policy typically aims to achieve the same
goals in a more interventionist fashion, but it often has broader
objectives as well. Examples from the telecommunications sector—
183 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 97 (“The
antitrust policy that is easiest to justify sticks to its essentially neoclassical roots, which
means pursuing maximum output by maintaining market competition.”).
184 See, e.g., William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address
at the International Bar Association: Conference on Competition Law and Policy in a Global
Context (Mar. 18, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/comparative-merger-controlanalysis-six-guiding-principles-antitrust-agencies-new-and-old (“The mission of an antitrust
authority should, therefore, be to protect competition in all of its forms and varieties because
competition is the one surefire way of guaranteeing that society’s resources will be put to
their most efficient use—keeping costs and the resulting prices low, and encouraging firms
to innovate.”).
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the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act) and the FCC’s
net neutrality rules—illustrate the point.
To encourage competition in the market for local telephone
service, the 1996 Act required incumbent local exchange carriers
(ILECs) to grant access to portions of their networks to competing
providers at “nondiscriminatory” rates based on “the cost . . . of
providing the interconnection,” plus, if they wanted, “a reasonable
profit.”185 It also restricted ILECs from entering the long-distance
market unless they complied with a set of requirements designed to
open their local markets to competition.186 The Act’s stated goals
were to “promote competition and reduce regulation in order to
secure lower prices and higher quality services for . . . consumers
and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies.”187
Similarly, in 2015, the FCC promulgated an Open Internet
Order,188 which set the rules of the road for competition in online
services. The Order barred broadband providers from blocking
consumer access to any lawful Internet content,189 from degrading
(“throttling”) lawful Internet content190 (“tantamount to
blocking”),191 and from engaging in “paid prioritization”—accepting
compensation to provide faster service (“fast lanes”) to certain
content providers.192 According to the FCC, the idea was “to ensure
47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1) (2012).
See id. § 271(c); Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Incentives to Speak Honestly About
Incentives: The Need for Structural Reform of the Local Competition Debate, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 399, 401 (2003) (describing section 271 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 as “the mechanism that keeps the largest ILECs, the Bell
companies, from competing in the long distance market until they open their local markets
to competition”).
187 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56.
188 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015).
189 Id. at 5607 (“A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access
service . . . shall not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices,
subject to reasonable network management.”).
190 Id. (“A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service . . . shall
not impair or degrade lawful Internet traffic on the basis of Internet content, application, or
service, or use of a non-harmful device, subject to reasonable network management.”)
191 Id.
192 Id. at 5607–08 (“A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access
service . . . shall not engage in paid prioritization,” which is the “management of a broadband
provider’s network to directly or indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic . . . either (a)
185
186
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that American communications networks develop in ways that
foster economic competition, technological innovation, and free
expression.”193 The agency reversed the Open Internet Order and
repealed its conduct rules with its December 2017 Restoring
Internet Freedom Order.194 The stated aims of the repeal were to
protect the open Internet while promoting investment in broadband
deployment.195
The goals of net neutrality are to optimize the conditions for
innovation and competition on the Internet.196 As Professor Tim Wu
put it in his seminal article coining the term, net neutrality’s aim is
to “preserv[e] a Darwinian competition among every conceivable use
of the Internet so that . . . only the best survive.”197 Because the FCC
determined that ex post antitrust enforcement might not
sufficiently ensure this competitive environment, regulation
mandating non-discrimination by broadband providers was deemed
necessary (until the agency reversed itself).198
Blockchain technology raises competition-policy issues that are
similar, but not identical, to those net neutrality addressed. Wu
described the application of net neutrality as “no different than the
challenge of promoting fair evolutionary competition in any
privately owned environment.”199 This description mirrors, at least
in part, the competition-policy challenge blockchain technology
presents. In some instances—privately held blockchain-based
derivatives clearinghouses are an example—the owners of a
blockchain network might disadvantage certain users or rivals who
need access to the network to compete.200 Because the banks that
control clearinghouses also compete in derivatives trading, they
in exchange for consideration (monetary or otherwise) from a third party, or (b) to benefit an
affiliated entity.”).
193 Id. at 5618.
194 Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 312–13 (2018).
195 Id. at 313.
196 Wu, supra note 43, at 142–44.
197 Id. at 142.
198 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5608 (“Although there are
arguments that some forms of paid prioritization could be beneficial, the practical difficulty
is this: the threat of harm is overwhelming, [and] case-by-case enforcement can be
cumbersome for individual consumers or edge providers . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
199 Wu, supra note 43, at 142.
200 See, e.g., supra notes 152 & 171.
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have strong incentives to discriminate against their trading
rivals.201 Such discrimination would threaten innovation, deter
lower prices in derivatives trading, and lead to a competitive
problem similar to that which net neutrality addressed. The
challenges dominant private blockchains pose are also reminiscent
of the competitive advantages ILECs held in local telephone
service.202 The analog to the Telecommunications Act would be a
requirement that firms controlling those dominant blockchains, like
derivatives clearinghouses, provide open and non-discriminatory
access to downstream rivals.
Blockchain’s competitive impact will be different than the
Internet’s in that, while there is only one Internet, there will be
many blockchains. In some circumstances, the relevant issue will
not be ensuring fair competition on a private platform, but rather
managing competition among new and incumbent platforms, both
blockchain-based and legacy-technology-based. The goals of
increased innovation, lower prices, and more consumer choice
should be consistent, however, whether regulators are dealing with
competition on a single platform or competition among platforms.
B. THREE KEY CHALLENGES

Regulators making blockchain competition policy must confront
three key challenges: (1) weighing the benefits of increased
competition against threats to safety and soundness; (2)
determining what is an acceptable degree of market
decentralization; and (3) deciding how to handle standardization,
open access, and non-discrimination issues on blockchain networks.
How financial regulators meet these challenges will determine in
large part whether blockchain technology will disrupt financial
markets.
1. Competition v. Safety & Soundness. There will be instances,
especially in the financial sector, where regulators will need to
consider how much competition is desirable and if “excessive”
competition might compromise other important policy goals,
201 See Griffith, supra note 100, at 1197 (asserting that the big banks may “use their
influence over clearinghouses . . . as a means of increasing their market share and excluding
competitors”).
202 Cf. supra notes 185–187 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol55/iss2/2

48

Weinstein: Blockchain Neutrality

2021]

BLOCKCHAIN NEUTRALITY

547

particularly consumer safety and systemic soundness. A boom in
derivatives trading facilitated by public blockchain-based
exchanges might lower prices for entering these contracts but create
regulatory headaches for the SEC and CFTC in their efforts to limit
systemic risk.203 A similar logic may apply to financial fraud. A spike
in ICOs, for example, may appear beneficial from a competition
standpoint but also might open the door to widespread fraud that
could stress the regulatory agencies’ enforcement capabilities.204
Antitrust courts and enforcement agencies typically reject safety
and soundness justifications for restraints on competition. In its
1978 decision in National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that a party’s attempt
to justify a competitive restraint based on “the potential threat that
competition poses to the public safety” amounted to “nothing less
than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.”205
That case involved a challenge to the National Society of
Professional Engineers’ canon of ethics, which barred members
from participating in competitive bidding for their services.206
Under the canon, members agreed not to negotiate or “even to
discuss the question of fees” until after being chosen for a particular
job.207 If a prospective client insisted on receiving pricing
information, the canon mandated that the member withdraw from
consideration for the contract.208 This policy made it difficult, or
even impossible, for potential clients to compare prices for
engineering services. The Court had no trouble determining that
the agreement, on its face, was a restraint of trade under section 1
of the Sherman Act.209 The Society, however, asserted that the
restraint was justified because, in its absence, engineers would be

203 See Surujnath, supra note 22, at 291 (“Existing regulations may not be sufficient to
address the risks posed by a blockchain derivatives market. . . . While blockchains can reduce
the risk of over-centralization, . . . blockchain technology may create systemic risks of a
different nature.”).
204 See, e.g., Cohney et al., supra note 22, at 594 (arguing that ICOs are “a financial form
ripe for fraud, and [they have] allegedly been used to that precise end”).
205 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
206 Id. at 681.
207 Id. at 682–83.
208 Id. at 683–84.
209 Id. at 693.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

49

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 2 [2020], Art. 2

548

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:499

tempted to make low bids on jobs and “do inferior work with
consequent risk to public safety and health.”210
The Court conceded that vigorous competition sometimes may
threaten consumer safety: the downward pricing pressure
competition creates in some circumstances can lead suppliers to cut
corners and market flawed or dangerous products.211 But the
Sherman Act, the Court reasoned, embodies the idea that
competition will result not only in lower prices, but also in higher
quality goods and services.212 Even if competition occasionally leads
to lower quality or risky goods, the “statutory policy” underpinning
the Sherman Act “precludes inquiry into the question whether
competition is good or bad.”213 The Court stressed that engineers’
frequent involvement in projects “significantly affecting the public
safety” did not change the analysis: “[e]xceptions to the Sherman
Act for potentially dangerous goods and services would be
tantamount to a repeal of the statute.”214 In other words, the
antitrust laws presume that competition will protect consumers
both from higher prices and from unsafe goods and services.215
Financial regulatory agencies take a very different approach to
the relationship between competition and safety and soundness.
The SEC and CFTC have statutory mandates to consider
competition in their work.216 Nonetheless, rather than assuming
that unfettered competition will lead to higher quality and safer
financial offerings, these agencies prioritize direct measures to fight
fraud and preserve systemic soundness while often ignoring their
competition mandates in regulating the markets they oversee.217
Id.
Id. at 694 (“[C]ompetition tends to force prices down and . . . an inexpensive item may
be inferior to one that is more costly. There is some risk, therefore, that competition will cause
some suppliers to market a defective product.”).
212 Id. at 695 (“The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition
will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.”).
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 See also FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462–64 (1986) (rejecting a patientsafety justification for a policy requiring federation members to deny insurers’ requests for
patient x-rays, which insurers would use to review claims for benefits).
216 See supra note 38.
217 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming,
87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 698 (2009) (“The SEC . . . is first and foremost an investor-protection and
information-disclosure agency, not an agency that investigates and weeds out cartels or other
210
211
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This disfavoring of competition considerations has not gone
unnoticed. In a 2018 speech, SEC commissioner Robert J. Jackson,
Jr. warned that the SEC had “forgotten a crucial part of our mission:
to pursue the kind of vigorous competition that American investors
deserve.”218 He asserted that the agency has “stood by while power
in our financial markets has become more concentrated than ever
before,” and he urged that the SEC “reclaim its historical role of
ensuring competition” in U.S. capital markets.219 The CFTC in some
instances has stated a commitment to promoting competition,220 but
its enforcement record shows little tangible evidence that it devotes
significant resources to independently pursuing competition cases;
the vast majority of its enforcement efforts focus on investor
protection and reducing systemic risk.221
The SEC’s and CFTC’s institutional cultures suggest that these
agencies will favor traditional investor protection and systemic
safety goals over maximizing competition when managing
blockchain’s impact on financial markets. This approach risks
forfeiting the opportunity blockchain networks offer for remaking
the financial sector. Another regulatory model exists, however, that
better addresses tensions between competition goals and public
safety, and which provides useful precedent for blockchain
competition policy: telecommunications and Internet regulation.
anticompetitive practices.”); Robert A. Jablon, Anjali G. Patel & Latif M. Nurani, Trinko and
Credit Suisse Revisited: The Need for Effective Administrative Agency Review and Shared
Antitrust Responsibility, 34 ENERGY L.J. 627, 649–50 (2013) (“Even where agencies have
express authority to include antitrust considerations within their regulatory functions, they
often neglect to enforce antitrust principles fully in deference to other priorities that they
deem more important as well as to needs that they consider more immediate.”).
218 Jackson, supra note 39.
219 Id.
220 See, e.g., Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Remarks,
American Bar Association, Committee on Derivatives and Futures Law (Feb. 4, 2011),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-67
(“Competition
is
essential to well-functioning markets.”); Reuben Jeffery III, Chairman, Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n, Opening Remarks, Hearing on Foreign Boards of Trade (June 27, 2006),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opajeffery-11 (“[T]he Commission hopes
to help foster a competitive level playing field, all the while avoiding interference with
legitimate market forces and competition.”).
221 See Samuel N. Weinstein, Financial Regulation in the (Receding) Shadow of Antitrust,
91 TEMP. L. REV. 447, 490 n.317 (2019) (reviewing CFTC independent enforcement actions
from 2017 and concluding that only one arguably involved a competition violation).
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While promoting a general policy of non-discrimination—which
encourages competition—net neutrality principles allow for
broadband providers to discriminate against harmful or fraudulent
applications.222 Put another way, net neutrality prohibits
discrimination against any third-party content or applications,
unless they harm consumers or network infrastructure. The same
principle animated earlier telecommunications regulations, such as
the 1957 FCC order requiring AT&T to rescind tariff regulations to
the extent that they barred customers from attaching to their
phones “any . . . device which does not injure [AT&T’s] employees,
facilities, the public in its use of [AT&T’s] services, or impair the
operation of the telephone system.”223 Similarly, the FCC’s 1968
Carterfone decision invalidated a tariff AT&T had filed barring any
non-AT&T equipment from being attached or connected to the
phone system.224 The FCC found that the Carterfone, which allowed
users to connect a telephone to a two-way radio by placing the
telephone handset in a cradle on the Carterfone device, “fill[ed] a
need[]” and did “not adversely affect the telephone system.”225 The
Carterfone ruling opened the telephone equipment market to
competition.226
Financial regulators should take a similar approach to
rulemaking and enforcement for blockchain-based financial222 See, e.g., Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5622 (2015)
(explaining that the Open Internet Order’s restrictions on Internet service providers blocking
or discriminating against certain content and applications were “subject to an exception for
‘reasonable network management,’ allowing service providers the freedom to address
legitimate needs such as avoiding network congestion and combatting harmful or illegal
conduct”); Wu, supra note 43, at 169 (advocating for “the practice of requiring public harm to
justify” discrimination against certain content and applications); Nicholas Economides, “Net
Neutrality,” Non-Discrimination and Digital Distribution of Content Through the Internet, 4
I/S 209, 217 (2008) (“The decentralization of the Internet based on ‘net neutrality’ facilitated
innovation resulting in successes such as the creation of the World Wide Web, Google, MSN,
Skype, Yahoo, etc.”).
223 Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. AT&T Co., 22 F.C.C. 112, 114 (1957).
224 Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C. 2d 420, 421, 426
(1968).
225 Id. at 423.
226 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 549–50 (1998) (“Beginning in the late 1960s with the Carterfone
decision, the FCC grudgingly began to allow competition into . . . the equipment . . . market.”
(footnote omitted)).
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services networks. As a default, to encourage competition and
innovation, regulation should require non-discrimination on
blockchain networks while allowing networks to discriminate
against applications that would harm the network or the public.
Participants in a private, blockchain-based, derivatives-clearing
network should have the authority to bar traders who are
perpetrating a fraud or who represent unreasonable credit risks.
That being said, close regulatory oversight of this authority is
advisable. Considering the big banks’ penchant for using bogus or
exaggerated safety and soundness considerations to disadvantage
derivatives-trading rivals, the SEC and CFTC must carefully
monitor exercise of alleged safety-based discrimination for
competitive abuses. The burden should be on discriminating firms
to produce a persuasive safety-based rationale for disadvantaging
specific users or applications.
Further, as a general matter, the agencies should recognize the
ways in which blockchain networks provide enhanced consumer
safety as compared to incumbent technologies. Transactions and
other data recorded on blockchains are more difficult to alter or
manipulate than data stored on centralized systems, thereby
offering users better protection against fraud.227 Regulators should
weigh this enhanced security when considering rules governing
blockchain competition.
As described in more detail below, the agencies currently appear
to be erring on the side of public safety at the expense of promoting
blockchain-related competition and innovation, but there are
hopeful indications that they may strike a more beneficial balance
in the future.
2. How Much Decentralization Should Regulators Promote or
Tolerate? Related to the challenge of weighing competition benefits
against threats to consumer and systemic safety is the level of

227 See Michael A. Holmes, Blockchain and the Future of Banking, 24 No. 12 WESTLAW J.
BANK & LENDER LIABILITY 01 (2018) (“[B]lockchain is much more secure than any other
commercially available system currently on the market.”); Divya Joshi, How Secure Is
Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Technology? Security Benefits and Issues of DLT, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 14, 2020, 11:18 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/cryptocurrencyblockchain-security (“As [blockchain] data cannot be overwritten, data manipulation is
extremely impractical, thus securing data and eliminating centralized points that
cybercriminals often target.”).
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decentralization regulators should promote or tolerate in financial
markets. A key attribute of blockchain networks is that they are
distributed and decentralized: trusted central gatekeepers and
platforms are not required to verify and record transactions. As a
result, end users can directly enter financial-services transactions
without employing the services of incumbent financial institutions.
As mentioned, this decentralization likely benefits competition
because it threatens the oligopolistic control big banks exercise over
a range of financial markets. But decentralization and
deconcentration create regulatory challenges. As Professor William
Magnuson has argued, market decentralization makes monitoring
emerging risks more difficult for regulators.228 Magnuson also
contends that while Dodd–Frank and much of the academic
literature on systemic risk has focused on the largest financial
institutions, smaller, decentralized market participants also
present systemic risks.229 Financial-sector regulators post-Dodd–
Frank have appropriately centered their attention on a short list of
giant financial institutions that—while posing significant systemic
risks—also are well known to regulators, heavily regulated, and
subject to broad disclosure requirements.230 Decentralization will
complicate this picture and force regulators to confront a new and
different set of challenges.
Nonetheless, decentralization and deconcentration of financialservices markets promise significant benefits to consumers that
might have important spillover effects for the broader economy.
Regulatory policies that encourage innovation and competition on
and among blockchain-based financial-services networks, and
between those networks and incumbent providers, should serve
traditional antitrust goals of lowering prices and increasing output.
But such policies also might achieve broader economic and social
ends.

228 See Magnuson, supra note 45, at 1205, 1207 (noting that “decentralization serves as a
barrier to effective monitoring” and that “by contributing to the fragmentation of finance,
fintech may be obscuring risk”).
229 Id. at 1199–1204 (describing the systemic risks posed by smaller, decentralized, fintech
firms).
230 Id. at 1205 (“[R]egulators . . . benefit from the fact that the relevant players are readily
identifiable and their behaviors are subject to extensive disclosure requirements.”).
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In recent years, a prominent critique has emerged of antitrust
law’s singular focus on consumer welfare.231 Critics argue that this
prevailing approach fails to account for the deleterious effects of
firm size when it does not result in higher consumer prices.232 They
point to damage to the political process, economic liberty, and labor
as harms insufficiently ameliorated by current antitrust policy.233
Decentralizing and deconcentrating the financial sector would
address at least some of these broader issues by reducing the power
and influence of the biggest financial institutions.
The largest and most influential financial firms have controlled
a variety of financial-services markets for an extended period.234 In
particular, Wall Street banks and Silicon Valley VCs dominate
access to capital, and big banks control most trading of financial
products.235 Blockchain-based networks present an opportunity to
231 See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 716
(2017) (“[T]he current framework in antitrust—specifically its equating competition with
‘consumer welfare,’ typically measured through short-term effects on price and output—fails
to capture the architecture of market power in the twenty-first century marketplace.”
(footnote omitted)).
232 See id. at 722 (“[I]t is fair to say that a concern for innovation or non-price effects rarely
animates or drives investigations or enforcement actions—especially outside of the merger
context.”).
233 See, e.g., TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 16 (2018)
(“Are extreme levels of industrial concentration actually compatible with the premise of rough
equality among citizens, industrial freedom, or democracy itself? . . . The questions, I think,
answer themselves.”).
234 See, e.g., Felix B. Chang, Second-Generation Monopolization: Parallel Exclusion in
Derivatives Markets, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 657, 698 (“[T]he membership profile of the
dominant . . . clearinghouses has remained unchanged from year to year.”); Arnold, supra
note 18 (“Wall Street’s top groups . . . [have] establish[ed] a seemingly unshakeable
dominance in global corporate and investment banking.”).
235 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK
TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES: SECOND QUARTER 2018, at 3 (2018),
https://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/derivatives/pub-derivativesquarterly-qtr2-2018.pdf (“A small group of large financial institutions continues to dominate
trading and derivatives activity in the U.S. commercial banking system.”); Hurt, supra note
19, at 705 (noting that in “[t]he market for initial public offerings . . . [a] small number of
investment banks and the underwriters and brokers they employ act as intermediaries that
distribute and market offerings for a substantial fee”); Mollick, supra note 19, at 4 (“For at
least a quarter century, technology entrepreneurship has been largely . . . defined by the
Silicon Valley model . . . . In that model, venture capital firms serve as a key actor, and are
often considered to be the most important actors in the system outside of the entrepreneurs
themselves.” (citations omitted)).
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undermine this dominance, offering individuals and firms greater
freedom in how they consume financial services. This shift might
achieve distributive ends as well. Historically, access to financial
services has been limited by class and race.236 Public blockchainbased financial services could broaden opportunities for firms and
individuals from underrepresented populations to raise capital and
enter the financial markets.237 This may benefit the political
process, too. For decades, the biggest financial institutions have had
enormous political sway.238 Increased competition in some of their
core businesses—including capital formation and financial-products
trading—might reduce that influence. In theory, blockchain
competition policy that promotes decentralization can both satisfy
traditional antitrust aims and tackle some of the broader societal
harms that concern advocates for antitrust reform.
While the regulatory challenges decentralization poses are real,
technological factors might mitigate these risks. Requiring all
permissioned financial blockchain networks to open a regulatory
node through which their assigned oversight agency can actively
monitor the network is technologically feasible, and the financial
regulators should mandate such access.239 Even if the amount of
information that flows through these nodes is too large for the
financial regulators to monitor all of it effectively, the mere threat
that regulators can see everything recorded on a blockchain may
reduce fraud on these networks. The permanence of information
236 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 20, at 189, 209 (demonstrating that the Federal Housing
Authority’s mortgage insurance program “systematically discriminated against AfricanAmericans,” resulting in “much lower rates of lending to nonwhites than to whites”); Pantin,
supra note 20, at 442 (“[A]s a practical matter, startup funding almost exclusively goes to
White men.” (footnote omitted)).
237 See, e.g., Amit Sharma, Underbanked Households Would Benefit from a Regulated
BANKER
(Aug.
26,
2020,
11:41
AM)
Blockchain,
A M.
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/if-blockchain-is-regulated-underbankedhouseholds-will-benefit (“Already there are targeted and tested applications of blockchain
that can help small businesses, underserved individuals and local communities weather the
coronavirus pandemic.”).
238 See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving
in to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1291 (2013) (“[T]he financial industry has shown a
continuing ability to influence politicians and regulators.”).
239 See CFTC TAC MEETING, supra note 1, at 55–56 (statement of Dan Bucsa) (observing
that regulatory nodes in distributed ledger technology offer regulators advantages, including
better access to data and “near real time” market oversight).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol55/iss2/2

56

Weinstein: Blockchain Neutrality

2021]

BLOCKCHAIN NEUTRALITY

555

stored on blockchains increases the benefits of these regulatory
nodes; network users will find it difficult to deceive regulators by
manipulating transaction records, so they may not even try.240
Blockchain’s immutability also serves to combat fraud more
generally and makes blockchain networks safer in this regard than
other kinds of financial networks where data manipulation is more
easily accomplished.241
Again, the development and regulation of the Internet should
serve as a useful model for the regulation of blockchain networks.
At least in its early form, the Internet offered a decentralized space
for commerce and innovation.242 That radical decentralization
proved to be fertile ground for the many types of Internet-based
fraud that quickly emerged.243 Yet regulators declined to take a
heavy-handed approach to Internet governance.244 The Clinton
Administration’s 1997 Framework for Electronic Commerce advised
that “[t]he private sector should lead” the development of electronic
commerce on the Internet, and “governments should encourage

See The Blockchain Is No Mere Hype Train, ASS’N CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS,
https://www.acfe.com/fraud-examiner.aspx?id=4294992645 (last visited Feb. 6, 2021)
(“Because the ledger is permanent, public and decentralized, it is incredibly difficult to
defraud.”); see also supra notes 52–54.
241 See, e.g., Magnuson, supra note 45, at 1185 (asserting that “[t]he distributed and
consensual nature of the [blockchain-based virtual currency] networks gives users greater
confidence that fraudulent transactions will be identified and prevented”).
242 See, e.g., William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent
to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197, 200–01 (1995) (“[T]he Internet
is . . . distributed . . . . It has no central governing authority . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Frances
E. Zollers, Peter Shears & Sandra N. Hurd, Fighting Internet Fraud: Old Scams, Old Laws,
New Context, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 169, 172 (2001) (“In the early days of the Net,
people referred to it as borderless, ‘cyberspace,’ a ‘magical world.’” (footnotes omitted)).
243 Zollers et al., supra note 242, at 169 (stating that “[t]he Internet provides a bold new
frontier” for “[c]on artists, scamsters, and opportunists” to “perpetrate old frauds”).
244 See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529,
531 (2009) (“[The FCC] self-consciously adopted a policy of ‘non-regulation’ toward the
Internet during its emergence as an important commercial network.”); William J. Clinton &
Albert
Gore,
Jr.,
A
Framework
for
Global
Electronic
Commerce,
https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2021) (“Governments can have a profound effect on the growth of commerce on the Internet.
By their actions, they can facilitate electronic trade or inhibit it. Knowing when to act and—
at least as important—when not to act, will be crucial to the development of electronic
commerce.”).
240
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industry self-regulation wherever appropriate” and “avoid undue
restrictions on electronic commerce.”245
The Framework recommended limited government intervention
in e-commerce markets to “ensure competition, protect intellectual
property and privacy, prevent fraud, foster transparency, support
commercial transactions, and facilitate dispute resolution.”246 This
strategy did not favor fraud prevention over decentralized
competition. Instead, it took the opposite approach: promoting
competition despite the risks of Internet-based fraud. The
Framework advised that “[c]ommerce on the Internet could total
tens of billions of dollars by the turn of the century,” but “[f]or this
potential to be realized fully, governments must adopt a nonregulatory, market-oriented approach to electronic commerce.”247 It
concluded that “widespread competition and increased consumer
choice should be the defining features of the new digital
marketplace.”248
While the Internet in recent years has become increasingly
centralized, as a handful of powerful platforms have come to
dominate many online industries, this initial permissiveness
toward decentralization allowed for tremendous innovation that
revolutionized markets.249 A similar approach to blockchain
regulation, one that would allow for decentralization of financial
markets, is preferable to policies that would prioritize centralization
and concentration to ease consumer-safety and systemic-risk
regulation. Decentralized blockchain-based competition might
245 Clinton & Gore, supra note 244. For a discussion of the Framework’s influence, see
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet at 20: Evolution of a Constitution for Cyberspace, 20 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1115, 1122 (2012) (describing the Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce as having “seminal and continuing influence” and being “analogous to the
Federalist Papers in articulating constitutional principles for the Internet”).
246 Clinton & Gore, supra note 244.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 See, e.g., Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or SelfRegulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace, 6
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 484 (1997) (“Under the current laissez-faire approach,
cyberspace has experienced exponential growth measured by the total number of users, total
volume or dollar value of commerce, and the advancement of the technology.”); Mark Lemley,
David S. Levine & David G. Post, Don’t Break the Internet, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34, 37
(2011) (“[T]he Internet’s uniquely decentralized structure . . . serve[s] as a global platform for
innovation, speech, collaboration, civic engagement, and economic growth.”).
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complicate regulation and increase opportunities for fraud, but the
competitive payoff should be worth the risk.
3. Standardization, Open Access, & Non-Discrimination. A third
key issue blockchain regulators will face is whether and how to
promote standardization, open access, and non-discrimination on
blockchain networks.250 The development of the Internet benefitted
from early government commitments to standardization and open
access.251 The Internet’s basic architecture has remained
nonproprietary (although portions of its infrastructure are now
privately owned),252 and scholars have argued that this openness
created fertile conditions for innovation.253 The FCC’s commitment
for many years to net neutrality principles ensured open and nondiscriminatory access for commercial applications on the Internet,
preserving its innovative and competitive environment.254 Similar
standardization and open-access issues are sure to arise in the
blockchain setting.

250 See Giovanna Massarotto, From Digital to Blockchain Markets. What Role for Antitrust
and
Regulation
20
(Jan.
26,
2019)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3323420
(“[A]
public
universal
blockchain might need rules to guarantee non-discrimination among market players.”).
251 See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 534, 537 (2003) (“During the Internet’s early years, the U.S. government
supported and encouraged a culture of nonproprietary development that self-consciously
protected the Internet’s open and layered architecture.”). Weiser argued that “[t]he essence”
of the Internet’s “open architecture was a commitment to using a platform standard that both
Internet users and providers of Internet content (and services) could access easily without
either limits on the use of the network or proprietary gatekeepers who could charge for access
to the standard.” Id.
252 Id. at 536 (explaining that “the Internet’s basic standard—the Transmission Control
Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) . . . remains nonproprietary”).
253 Id. at 537 (“[The Internet’s] open platform standard . . . has enabled Internet application
developers to create new products and services and users to adopt those products easily,
thereby creating a virtuous circle of an increasing number of applications and users for
Internet [content].” (footnote omitted)).
254 While the FCC codified net neutrality in its 2015 Open Internet Order, Protecting and
Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015), the agency had promoted net
neutrality in various ways before 2015, including by issuing a 2010 Open Internet Order
implementing net neutrality. See Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry
Practices 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
struck down key portions of the 2010 rule in January 2014. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623,
628 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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As a general matter, standard setting is often procompetitive.255
Standards promote interoperability and allow manufacturers to
innovate and compete to provide products conforming to the
standard.256 The standard-gauge railroad track is an example of
these interoperability benefits,257 as is competition among
smartphone manufacturers, which is made possible in part by
wireless network standards.258 By requiring some degree of product
uniformity, standards typically make it easier for consumers to
compare competing offerings. Standards are also thought to lower
barriers to entry for new competitors and to reduce the costs of
introducing and marketing conforming products.259
But standard-setting can be abused. Typically, standards either
are developed by private standard-setting organizations (SSOs) or
government agencies, or they are created through market
competition in a “standards war.” When competitors come together
in an SSO to collaboratively develop a standard, there is a risk of
See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988)
(“[P]rivate standards can have significant procompetitive advantages.”); James J. Anton &
Dennis A. Yao, Standard-Setting Consortia, Antitrust, and High-Technology Industries, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 247, 248 (1995) (“There is a general consensus that standards provide a wide
variety of substantial procompetitive benefits.”).
256 See J. Gregory Sidak, The Value of a Standard Versus the Value of Standardization, 68
BAYLOR L. REV. 59, 61 (2016) (“Standardization enables better interoperability between
devices and network elements produced or operated by different parties.”); Letter from
Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Michael A. Lindsay
(Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/response-institute-electrical-and-electronicsengineers-incorporated (“Standards offer significant procompetitive benefits. For example,
standards can facilitate product interoperability, ensuring that products from a variety of
suppliers will work together efficiently . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
257 See Peter S. Menell, Economic Analysis of Network Effects and Intellectual Property, 34
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 219, 226 (2019) (“Standardized railroad gauge, for example, supported
far-reaching railroad networks, promoted competition in locomotive and railcar markets, and
enabled interconnected rail services.”).
258 See, e.g., Kirti Gupta, Technology Standards and Competition in the Mobile Wireless
Industry, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 865, 869 (2015) (“Technology standards reside at the heart
of [the mobile wireless] industry. Without common standards, users would not experience the
worldwide interoperability and interconnectivity across mobile devices at the core of
wireless’s business and consumer appeal.”).
259 See, e.g., Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 330 F. Supp. 2d 679, 696 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(“[N]ew producers have easier entry into a market when standards exist . . . . [A] standardized
technology core also lowers a company’s cost of developing a next generation product[, and]
producers have lower marketing costs in bringing products to a predefined, standardized
market.”).
255
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various forms of anticompetitive conduct. As the U.S. Supreme
Court has warned, SSOs “can be rife with opportunities for
anticompetitive activity.”260 For example, powerful incumbents
could abuse the standard-setting process to choose a favored
technology or set of technologies over a nascent competitor’s
potentially more efficient technology or set of technologies.261 Or,
once a standard is set, SSO members may try to gain a competitive
advantage by falsely asserting to potential customers that
competitors’ products or services do not comport with the standard
and are unsafe or unreliable.262 These forms of abuse could harm
competition in blockchain networks.
Many standards are developed by government agencies rather
than private SSOs. The anticompetitive risks of government
standard-setting stem from the potential for market participants to
influence the standard-setting process to favor their proprietary
technologies. Because government standards often have the force of
law, they can grant significant market power to firms with
intellectual property (IP) rights included in the standard.263 Firms
therefore may pressure the government to incorporate their
technologies in a standard or to adopt a privately created
standard.264 These risks might arise should government agencies
decide to set blockchain-related standards.
The risks of anticompetitive conduct relating to a standard are
particularly acute when incorporated technologies are protected by
IP rights. Before a standard is set, technologies can compete to
become part of the standard. Once the standard is established,
Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 571 (1982).
See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 495–99 (1988)
(finding no Noerr antitrust immunity for members of an SSO that had conspired to exclude a
competing technology from a standard for electrical conduit).
262 See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, 456 U.S. at 571–73 (holding that an SSO is subject
to antitrust liability when its agent violates the antitrust laws by issuing an interpretation
of a standard that inaccurately declares a competitor’s product to be unsafe).
263 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal., 138 F.T.C. 1, 2 (2004) (addressing allegations that “[a]
private business . . . induce[d] a government body to issue regulatory standards that conferred
market power upon the firm”).
264 See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 486 U.S. at 511 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing
application of Noerr antitrust immunity to “private organizations, such as the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA), that regularly propound and publish health and safety
standards for a variety of products and industries and then present these codes to state and
local authorities for the purpose of having them enacted into law”).
260
261
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however, firms with IP rights covering technologies incorporated in
the standard can charge royalties to firms building products that
conform to the standard. This scenario offers IP holders the power
to “hold up” implementers of the standard for higher royalties on
their “standard essential patents” (SEPs) than they could have
charged before their technology was incorporated in the standard.265
With this risk of hold-up in mind, SSOs typically require members
to disclose any IP rights they possess over technologies that the SSO
might include in a standard and to commit to licensing their SEPs
on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms.266
As discussed in detail below, incumbent financial firms already
are moving to create blockchain-related standards and patent
blockchain technologies.267 Under the Trump Administration, the
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice signaled that
it was unlikely to pursue cases involving SEP hold-up claims, and
the Division generally appeared inclined to favor IP holders in
disputes with implementers.268 This stance may change in the Biden
Administration, but to prevent anticompetitive standard-setting
abuses and preserve open and non-discriminatory access to
blockchain technology and platforms, Congress and the sector
regulators may need to act. Otherwise, incumbent financial-services

265 See Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND
Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 366 (2007) (“Patent license disputes
from outside the SSO context suggest that if participants were to wait until after the standard
were set before working out any license terms those who turned out to own essential patents
could hold up patentless adopters for a disproportionate share of the standardized
technology's substantial coordination value.”).
266 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties
for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1136–37 (2013) (“The vast
majority of standard-setting organizations (‘SSOs’) require their members to commit to
license any standard-essential patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (‘FRAND’)
terms. These FRAND commitments . . . promote the standard by assuring companies
implementing the standard that they will not be blocked from bringing their products to
market or held up so long as they are willing to pay reasonable royalties for any standardessential patents . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
267 See infra Section V.D.
268 See, e.g., Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antirust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Antitrust Law and Patent Licensing in the New Wild West 2 (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1095011/download (“[T]he theory and evidence of
unilateral ‘hold-up’ by patent-holders does not provide an adequate basis to condemn such
conduct under the antitrust laws generally.”).
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firms may manipulate standards and use control over blockchainrelated IP to quash competition and preserve their dominant
positions in financial markets.
C. INSTITUTIONS

Developing effective blockchain competition policy not only
requires articulating and pursuing clear goals but also taking into
account the capabilities of the institutions that will make and
enforce that policy. Understanding the prospects for blockchain
competition policy in the financial markets requires evaluating the
role and capacities of the SEC and CFTC as competition policy
makers and enforcers.
The financial regulatory agencies have recognized the growing
significance of blockchain-based networks in the markets they
oversee.269 The SEC has appointed a senior advisor for digital assets
and innovation to coordinate the agency’s response to the growth of
cryptocurrencies and ICOs.270 The CFTC’s Technology Advisory
Committee, in February 2018, approved subcommittees dedicated
to cryptocurrencies and blockchains.271 Both agencies have brought
several enforcement actions related to cryptocurrencies and
ICOs.272 In 2019 alone, the SEC initiated seventeen digital

269 See, e.g., Brian Quintenz, Comm’r, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Keynote
Address
Before
the
DC
Blockchain
Summit
(Mar.
7,
2018),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaquintenz8 (describing growth of
cryptocurrencies and blockchain-based technologies as a “technological revolution, which
promises to transform the building blocks not just of our financial markets, but of commerce
in general”).
270 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names Valerie A. Szczepanik Senior
Advisor for Digital Assets and Innovation (June 4, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2018-102.
271 CFTC TAC MEETING, supra note 1, at 80, 149 (approving subcommittees on “distributed
ledger technology” and “virtual currencies”).
272 See, e.g., CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (granting the
CFTC injunctive relief in a case alleging that defendants had “operated a deceptive and
fraudulent virtual currency scheme . . . for purported virtual currency trading advice” and
“for virtual currency purchases and trading . . . and simply misappropriated [investor] funds”
(alterations in original) (quoting Complaint at 1, CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-00361)); SEC v. Plexcorps, No. 17-cv-7007, 2018 WL 3038500, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2018) (granting the SEC a preliminary injunction in a case involving
alleged fraudulent and unregistered sale of securities in an ICO).
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asset/ICO enforcement actions, and the agency brought another
twenty-three cases in 2020.273
The SEC and CFTC have statutory mandates to protect
competition in financial markets.274 As some scholars have argued,
however, history, theory, and data suggest that the financial
regulatory agencies are not particularly willing or effective
competition enforcers.275 Several explanations for this deficiency
exist, but perhaps the most persuasive is that, despite their
statutory mandates, competition is a low priority for the financial
regulators as compared to what they perceive to be their primary
missions: maintaining systemic soundness and preventing financial
fraud.276 Achieving the broad economic and social transformations
that blockchain-based competition may make possible in the
financial markets likely will require regulators to place competition
on an equal or near-equal footing with systemic soundness and antifraud efforts. Active competition-directed policymaking and
enforcement would be necessary. These agencies’ organization and
cultures, with their lack of competition expertise and personnel and
their strong commitment to non-competition goals (sometimes at
the expense of competition), suggest that they may be uncertain
stewards for a competitive remaking of the financial markets.
The contrast between the SEC and CFTC on the one hand and
the FCC on the other is instructive. The latter agency has a
dedicated competition unit and experienced competition lawyers.277
273 See
Cyber
Enforcement
Actions,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersecurity-enforcement-actions (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).
274 See supra note 38.
275 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 217, at 698 (“[The SEC] is unlikely to devote much in
the way of time or resources to [stopping anticompetitive conduct], because even if it is tasked
to consider such issues, they do not reflect the agency’s primary purpose.”); Weinstein, supra
note 221, at 491 (“It seems clear that the financial services agencies are either unwilling or
unable to ‘perform the antitrust function’ as envisioned by the Supreme Court’s case law
balancing antitrust and regulation.”).
276 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 217, at 697–98 (“Even those agencies [like the SEC]
whose mission expressly involves the consideration of competition issues will not necessarily
make it their first among potentially conflicting priorities.”).
277 See Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N,
https://www.fcc.gov/general/competition-policy-division-wireline-competition-bureau
(last
visited Feb. 7, 2021) (showing that the FCC’s Competition Policy Division is housed in its
Wireline Competition Bureau and its “primary mission is to foster competition in the
provision of communications services”).
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When the FCC determines that effective competition enforcement
requires further expertise, it calls on outside antitrust lawyers to
assist in particular investigations.278 Its organization and actions
demonstrate that the FCC takes competition policy and
enforcement seriously. The financial regulators to date have not
approached competition matters in the same systematic fashion.
Nonetheless, there are some hopeful signs that, where
competition is consistent with these agencies’ other goals, the SEC
and CFTC may actively encourage new entrants and disruptive
innovation. As discussed in detail below, cryptocurrencies, token
sales, and equities settlement services are examples of areas where
the SEC and CFTC already appear to appreciate the competitive
promise of blockchain technology, and they are evaluating
regulations with that promise in mind. Individual commissioners at
both agencies have emphasized the importance of protecting and
promoting competition in financial markets. CFTC Commissioner
Brian Quintenz, for example, has put competition on the same plane
as fraud prevention and consumer safety, each of which he describes
as key elements of the “strongest financial markets,” including
futures markets.279 And SEC Commissioner Robert J. Jackson, Jr.
argued in a 2018 speech that the agency should do more to promote
competition in capital markets.280 However, to the extent that
entrenched bureaucratic cultures prevent these agencies from
promoting the spread of blockchain-based competition, Congress
may need to step in and fill the regulatory gap.

278 For example, in June 2018, the FCC hired David Lawrence, an attorney in the Antitrust
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, to coordinate the FCC’s review of the proposed
merger of T-Mobile US, Inc. and Sprint Corporation. See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n, David Lawrence to Lead T-Mobile/Sprint Transaction Task Force (June 27, 2018),
https://www.fcc.gov/document/david-lawrence-lead-t-mobilesprint-transaction-task-force.
279 Brian Quintenz, Comm’r, Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, Remarks at the 14th
Annual
China
International
Derivatives
Forum
(Nov.
30,
2018),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaquintenz18 (asserting that the
“strongest financial markets are shaped” by a “mixture of competition and accountability,”
and the combination of “fierce competition, stringent accountability, and legal certainty
attracts investors, businesses, and capital” to financial markets, including futures markets).
280 Jackson, supra note 39 (arguing that the SEC has “forgotten a crucial part of [its]
mission: to pursue the kind of vigorous competition that American investors deserve,” and
proposing the creation of an Office of Competition Economics at the agency).
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V. BLOCKCHAIN COMPETITION POLICY FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES
How the key blockchain competition-policy issues the previous
Part explored will play out in the financial markets remains an open
question. This Part applies the principles discussed above to four
specific challenges emerging in blockchain-based financial services:
paid prioritization, blockchain-based derivatives trading, the sharp
growth in token sales, and standardization and IP-related risks.
A. PAID PRIORITIZATION

The architecture of blockchain networks makes it possible for
users verifying transactions to choose the order in which they record
those transactions. In the Bitcoin blockchain network, for example,
the miners who confirm transactions may choose to prioritize those
that offer the biggest monetary payoff, putting them in a so-called
fast lane, while other, less lucrative transactions languish in a slow
lane.281
In the blockchain context, paid prioritization refers to the
practice of users paying to have their transactions recorded on a
block ahead of users who have paid less or not at all.282 This is only
one form of discrimination possible on blockchain networks.
Vertically integrated firms controlling a permissioned network may
provide faster service to their related entities at the expense of
competitors.283 The derivatives-processing blockchain network that
DTCC is creating presents a good example of these potential
See Improving Our Fee Recommendations, BLOCKCHAIN.COM (June 14, 2017),
https://medium.com/blockchain/improving-our-fee-recommendations-11722afccd6
(“In
Bitcoin, transaction fees are used to incentivize miners to confirm transactions . . . . Rational
miners will select transactions paying a higher fee per byte.”).
282 See Falk Schoening, What Blockchain Can Learn from the Net Neutrality Debate:
Antitrust and Regulatory Aspects of “Paid Prioritization” for a Nascent Technology, HOGAN
LOVELLS:
FOCUS
ON
REGULATION
(Nov.
7,
2017),
https://www.hlregulation.com/2017/11/07/what-blockchain-can-learn-from-the-netneutrality-debate-antitrust-and-regulatory-aspects-of-paid-prioritization-for-a-nascenttechnology/ (“A paid prioritization blockchain environment can create a dual speed
blockchain: one for those who can or want to pay more and one for those who can’t or simply
don’t want to do so and whose transactions accordingly lag behind.”).
283 IOANNIS
LIANOS,
BLOCKCHAIN
COMPETITION
74–76
(2018),
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/sites/cles/files/cles_8-2018.pdf
(discussing
how
vertically
integrated firms may use blockchain to anticompetitively disadvantage rivals).
281
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risks.284 By manipulating the speed at which transactions are
processed, the big banks controlling this blockchain could disfavor
trades entered directly by public users on a permissionless
blockchain-based derivatives exchange as well as trades facilitated
by rival dealers. Perhaps more worrisome, if the big banks
established a dominant blockchain-based derivatives clearinghouse,
they could use paid prioritization to slow down trades made on
emergent exchanges or by competing dealers, forestalling
competition.
This kind of discrimination may harm users in the “slow lane”
and raise both antitrust and competition-policy issues. On one level,
this problem is reminiscent of the net neutrality debate and the
issues the Telecommunications Act of 1996 addressed. The FCC’s
2015 Open Internet Order prohibited paid prioritization of services
by broadband providers, barring them from favoring any specific
“content, applications, services, or devices.”285 The FCC has
developed competition policy regarding paid prioritization and other
forms of discrimination broadly for the entire Internet. Indeed, the
agency determined that even though “there are arguments that
some forms of paid prioritization could be beneficial,” a sweeping
net neutrality rulemaking was required because the threat of harm
to innovation from the practice is “overwhelming” and “case-by-case
enforcement can be cumbersome.”286 The Open Internet Order
recognized that broadband providers can act as “gatekeepers
standing between” purveyors of online services and consumers.287
These gatekeepers can determine the content consumers can access
and are able to “target competitors, including competitors to their
own video services.”288 The competition theory animating the Open
Internet Order was that such anticompetitive conduct “actually
chokes consumer demand for the very broadband product” the
gatekeepers supply.289 Under this theory, more innovation in online
services will lead to greater demand for broadband infrastructure—

See supra notes 110–119 & 165 and accompanying text.
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5607 (2015).
286 Id. at 5608.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Id.
284
285

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

67

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 2 [2020], Art. 2

566

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:499

a “virtuous cycle,” in which innovative online service providers and
broadband providers both win.290
An assumption underlying the Open Internet Order’s approach
to competition policy is that competition among broadband
providers is not sufficient to address the paid prioritization
challenge. In theory, if consumers have access to multiple
broadband providers, some of which employ paid prioritization and
some of which do not, the market could sort out the optimal
approach. In this scenario, some consumers might choose a provider
that did not employ paid prioritization because their favored online
service, say Netflix, had good streaming speeds on that provider,
and they might reject a competing provider which offered slow
speeds for Netflix and faster speeds for a competing service. But this
theory holds only if there is robust competition among broadband
providers in local markets and among wireless carriers. To the
contrary, the evidence suggests that competition among wireline
Internet service providers is limited in many local markets.291 And,
even though competition among wireless carriers seems more
robust for now,292 net neutrality is a sensible approach to these
Id. at 5608–09.
See, e.g., WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS
SERVICES:
STATUS
AS
OF
DECEMBER
31,
2016,
at
6
(2018),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-349074A1.pdf (showing the number of
broadband providers at various speeds by census blocks, demonstrating that for speeds of at
least 100Mbps 85% of census blocks had either one or no providers); Sascha Segan, Exclusive:
Check Out the Terrible State of US ISP Competition, PCMAG (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.pcmag.com/news/357972/exclusive-data-shows-the-terrible-state-of-us-ispcompetitio (“[A]t 25Mbps, the FCC’s definition of broadband, most Americans have two or
fewer choices . . . .”).
292 See, e.g., Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993, 32 FCC Rcd. 8968, 8970–71 (2017) (determining on a three to two party-line vote
that there is “effective competition” in the provision of mobile wireless services); Timothy B.
Lee, Competition Just Forced Verizon to Offer an Unlimited Data Plan, VOX (Feb. 15, 2017,
1:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/new-money/2017/2/15/14598752/verizon-unlimited-wirelesscompetition (“[C]ompetition is working in the wireless industry.”). The 2020 merger between
Sprint and T-Mobile might reduce competition in the wireless market. See, e.g., Applications
of T-Mobile US, Inc., and Sprint Corporation For Consent To Transfer Control of Licenses
and Authorizations, Applications of American H Block Wireless L.L.C., DBSD Corporation,
Gamma Acquisition L.L.C., and Manifest Wireless L.L.C. for Extension of Time, WT Docket
No. 18-197, Statement of Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel, Dissenting 1 (Oct. 16, 2019),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-103A5.pdf (“The proposed tie-up of T-Mobile
and Sprint will reduce competition.”).
290
291
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markets when it appears that providers may not face competitive
consequences for disfavoring innovative competitors by placing
them in a slow lane.
Opponents of net neutrality and rules limiting paid prioritization
for broadband providers assert that these policies dull incentives for
providers to invest in broadband infrastructure.293 This argument
animated the FCC’s 2017 reversal of the Open Internet Order.294
Other critics of the FCC’s net neutrality rules argue that they were
unnecessary because competition sufficiently protects consumers
seeking innovative online services and antitrust enforcement can
address any circumstances where competition fails.295
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 similarly barred
discrimination on proprietary networks controlled by local
telephone monopolists. The Act required incumbent local exchange
carriers (ILECs) to provide competitors with access to their
networks “on . . . just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” terms.296
The Act’s aim was to create competition in previously monopolized
local telecommunications markets by subjecting ILECs “to a host of
duties intended to facilitate market entry.”297 The FCC struggled to
promulgate rules implementing the 1996 Act that would pass
judicial muster,298 and scholars have criticized the agency’s

293 See, e.g., Ajit Pai, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks of Chairman Ajit Pai on
Restoring Internet Freedom (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-chairman-pairemarks-restoring-internet-freedom (claiming that net neutrality rules resulted in “less
infrastructure investment”).
294 See Restoring Internet Freedom, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N https://www.fcc.gov/restoringinternet-freedom (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) (claiming that the FCC’s Restoring Internet
Freedom Order would be beneficial because the Commission’s net neutrality rules had “made
things worse by limiting investment in high-speed networks and slowing broadband
deployment”).
295 See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Antitrust Over Net Neutrality: Why We Should Take
Competition in Broadband Seriously, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 119, 119 (2016) (“[M]arket forces
driven by consumer demand would punish broadband service providers that throttled or
excluded desired content. And . . . antitrust would forbid efforts by ISPs with significant
market power to foreclose rival content.”).
296 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(D) (2012).
297 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999).
298 See, e.g., id. at 387–92, 397 (striking down an FCC rule that mandated the provision of
network elements to competing carriers).
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approach to forced sharing,299 but the Act’s goal, in some respects,
was similar to the goal of net neutrality: to allow “anyone [to] enter
any communications business”300 by mandating access and barring
discrimination on what were considered to be competitively
necessary platforms.301
With net neutrality and the Telecommunications Act, the FCC
and Congress set a unified competition policy for the entirety of the
Internet and telephony markets. Financial regulators may not have
that luxury. The SEC and CFTC could establish a blanket
regulatory framework regarding paid prioritization and other
discriminatory conduct for all blockchain networks subject to their
regulatory authority. But such a framework would be a blunt
instrument that would not be tailored to the various ways
blockchain technology might be employed in the financial sector. A
better approach would be for the agencies to decide on a case-bycase basis how to regulate paid prioritization and other types of
discrimination. The agencies should consider one metric in
particular—the competitiveness of the market in which a specific
network operates. Does the market resemble local broadband
markets, which arguably are sufficiently concentrated such that
competitive pressures will not forestall broadband gatekeepers’ use
of paid prioritization to harm competition? Or does the market
appear competitive enough to make the agencies reasonably
confident that consumers will be able to determine the optimal
amount of paid prioritization?

299 See, e.g., Jonathan E. Nuechterlein & Philip J. Weiser, First Principles for an Effective
Rewrite of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 7 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory
Studies, Working Paper No. 05-03, 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=707124 (criticizing the
FCC’s implementation of forced sharing requirements as paying “insufficient heed to
antitrust law’s admonition against focusing more on the success of selected competitors than
on . . . setting the ground rules for economically efficient competition”).
300 Telecommunications
Act
of
1996,
FED.
COMMC’NS
COMM’N,
https://www.fcc.gov/general/telecommunications-act-1996 (last updated June 20, 2013).
301 See Nicholas Economides, Katja Seim & V. Brian Viard, Quantifying the Benefits of
Entry into Local Phone Service, 39 RAND J. ECON. 699, 725 (2008) (“A major goal of the 1996
Telecommunications Act was to encourage entry into local phone service with the objectives
of achieving better alignment between prices and costs, increased service quality, increased
variety of service offerings, and efficiency gains in the form of ‘one-stop shopping’ across
different telecommunications services.”).
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Two examples illustrate the point. Some cryptocurrency
platforms, like Bitcoin, already feature paid prioritization. Parties
transacting on the Bitcoin blockchain can pay miners to have their
transactions recorded on a block ahead of other transactions.302 If
the cryptocurrency market is not sufficiently competitive, Bitcoin
users will have no choice but to accept these “fast lane” fees. If
consumers have other choices (either competing cryptocurrencies or
traditional payment systems), then they may decide not to accept
Bitcoin’s fast-lane payments and defect to a competitive
alternative.303 Currently, consumers have a range of choices when
it comes to cryptocurrencies and payment systems more
generally.304 As long as these options remain, there is no pressing
reason for the SEC or CFTC to regulate the use of paid prioritization
on the Bitcoin blockchain. Indeed, such regulation might be
anticompetitive and innovation-retarding.305
A dominant derivatives-clearing blockchain may require a
different regulatory approach. If the big banks controlled a
blockchain-based monopoly provider of derivatives-clearing
services, then they might use paid prioritization or other forms of
discrimination to restrict competition and innovation in derivatives
trading without fear of losing market share to competing derivatives
clearinghouses. It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which
such a dominant clearinghouse sets up a fast lane for trades
facilitated by the big banks and slows down or rejects altogether
trades executed on public, permissionless, blockchain-based
derivatives exchanges. By disfavoring trades made on emergent

See supra note 281.
See Peder Østbye, The Adequacy of Competition Policy for Cryptocurrency Markets 22
(Aug. 24, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3025732 (“Excessive transaction fees might be a dangerous play for block validators. High
transaction fees will make the currency less attractive and, hence, diminish the value of the
currency with which the transaction fees are paid and new coins are awarded.”).
304 Id. at 24 (“Today, it must be assumed that the traditional payment system puts a
restraint on the possibility for the exploitation of market power in cryptocurrencies.”).
305 See, e.g., Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Beaches and Bitcoin:
Remarks
before
the
Medici
Conference
(May
2,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peirce-050218 (“[R]egulator[s] should be careful not
to try to control the development of new technologies. . . . The law deserves respect, but
technological progress should not be bound by the limits of the regulator’s lawyerly
imagination.”).
302
303
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public exchanges, the big banks could try to preserve the
supracompetitive profits they enjoy on OTC trades they facilitate.306
To the extent the SEC and CFTC want to encourage competition
in derivatives trading (and there are reasons they may not want to
expand such competition),307 they could prohibit paid prioritization
and other forms of discrimination on a dominant blockchain-based
clearinghouse. Current law may do some of this work for the
agencies. Dodd–Frank, for example, prohibits a clearinghouse from
discriminating against derivatives trades executed on exchanges
unaffiliated with that clearinghouse.308 If paid prioritization
violates the requirement of “non-discriminatory clearing” of a swap,
the agencies may not have to regulate any further on this issue.309
If it does not, additional regulation may be required. The same type
of issue might arise in equities trading, token sales, and other
blockchain applications in the financial markets. In each case, the
SEC and CFTC must determine whether they should set the
competitive rules of the road regarding paid prioritization and other
forms of discrimination for particular blockchain uses in the same
way the FCC created those rules of the road (and later changed
them) for the Internet.
If the agencies choose not to regulate paid prioritization,
antitrust law may have a role to play in addressing the issue.310 A
plaintiff whose transactions are relegated to a blockchain’s slow
lane may argue that it has suffered competitive harm if it loses out
on favorable deals (and ultimately market share) as a result. Such
a plaintiff might assert that this type of conduct amounts to an
unlawful refusal to deal or is grounds for an essential facilities

306 See, e.g., In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014 WL
4379112, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014) (detailing allegations that Dealer–Defendants
conspired to prevent the emergence of credit default swap exchange trading to “keep[] the
market opaque, prevent[] competition, and maintain[] inflated bid/ask spreads”).
307 See infra notes 316–320 and accompanying text.
308 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(a)(2) (2018) (mandating open access to clearinghouses and that
clearing must be “non-discriminatory”).
309 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(1)(B)(ii) (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(a)(2)(B) (2018).
310 See Ohlhausen, supra note 295, at 141 (arguing that “[c]onsumers would enjoy
protection in a world without net neutrality” because antitrust law is “well positioned to
tackle” cases involving “harmful exclusion, throttling, or paid prioritization by ISPs”).
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claim.311 The success of such claims is by no means certain.
Plaintiffs would have to show that the blockchain in question has
market power and that no realistic competitive alternatives exist.312
Further, if the transaction or service in question is regulated,
defendants may be able to claim implied antitrust immunity for
their conduct.313
B. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED DERIVATIVES TRADING

Emergent public blockchain-based derivatives exchanges have
the potential to upend the derivatives markets.314 By allowing allto-all direct trading by end-users, these exchanges should reduce
pricing opacity and may disintermediate derivatives dealers.315 The
financial regulatory agencies could play a central role in
determining whether these new exchanges are given the
opportunity to reshape derivatives trading. The big banks, which
currently control derivatives clearing and trading, will likely resist
these changes, and the CFTC and SEC must determine how they
will respond.
To do so, the agencies will need to decide how much competition
in derivatives trading is desirable. This issue is complicated by the

311 See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
408 (2004) (“Under certain circumstances, a refusal to cooperate with rivals can constitute
anticompetitive conduct and violate § 2 [of the Sherman Act].”). To prevail on an essential
facilities claim, a plaintiff typically must show “(1) control of the essential facility by a
monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential
facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of
providing the facility.” MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir.
1983).
312 See MCI Commc’ns, 708 F.2d at 1132–33 (describing the elements of an essentialfacilities claim).
313 Courts may find that regulated conduct is immunized from antitrust liability in cases
where there is a “plain repugnancy” between a relevant regulatory regime and the antitrust
laws. Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975) (quoting United States v.
Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350–51 (1963)).
314 See Surujnath, supra note 22, at 257 (“The blockchain could radically reinvent the
existing [derivatives] market infrastructure.”).
315 See, e.g., In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d 430, 475 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (“All-to-all exchange trading, however, threatened to slash the Dealers’ margins by
‘billions of dollars’ by disintermediating them.”).
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systemic risks derivatives can pose.316 If emergent exchanges make
derivatives trading cheaper and more accessible, the size of these
markets likely will increase.317 Fragmentation of trading onto a
number of smaller exchanges may also make keeping tabs on
derivatives markets and identifying risky trading conduct more
challenging.318 The regulatory agencies might prefer to deal only
with the small number of big banks that currently control
derivatives trading.319 Indeed, their general commitment to
systemic stability over increased competition suggests that the
agencies may opt for a less competitive and less risky derivatives
sector rather than one where emergent exchanges democratize and
expand derivatives trading.320
There are early indications that the agencies will take a cautious
tack toward new competitors in these markets. The CFTC, for
instance, has issued guidance on its approach to cryptocurrency
futures markets.321 In December 2017, the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange and the CBOE Futures Exchange created new Bitcoin
futures products.322 Around the same time, the Cantor Exchange

316 See Griffith, supra note 100, at 1153 (“Derivatives transactions create systemic risk by
threatening to spread the consequences of default throughout the financial system.”).
317 See, e.g., Crypto Derivatives Are on the Rise, INT’L BANKER (Sept. 10, 2020),
https://internationalbanker.com/brokerage/crypto-derivatives-are-on-the-rise/ (noting that
the trading volume of the crypto-derivatives market had increased 165.56% since 2019).
318 See, e.g., Magnuson, supra note 45, at 1205, 1207 (noting that “decentralization serves
as a barrier to effective monitoring” and that “by contributing to the fragmentation of finance,
fintech may be obscuring risk”).
319 Id. at 1205 (“[R]egardless of what we may think about the success of financial regulators
in reining in the behavior of large financial institutions since the financial crisis, regulators
at least benefit from the fact that the relevant players are readily identifiable and their
behaviors are subject to extensive disclosure requirements.”).
320 See supra notes 217–221 and accompanying text.
321 OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, CFTC
BACKGROUNDER ON OVERSIGHT OF AND APPROACH TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY FUTURES MARKETS
1–4 (2018) [hereinafter CFTC BACKGROUNDER], https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/
groups/public/%40customerprotection/documents/file/backgrounder_virtualcurrency01.pdf.
322 See CME Group Announces Launch of Bitcoin Futures, CME GROUP (Oct. 31, 2017),
https://www.cmegroup.com/media-room/press-releases/2017/10/31/cme_group_announces
launchofbitcoinfutures.html (announcing CME’s launch of bitcoin futures in the fourth
quarter of 2017); Brady Dale, CBOE Releases New Details on Bitcoin Futures Contracts,
COINDESK (Nov. 20, 2017, 9:10 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/cboe-releases-new-details-onbitcoin-futures-contracts (describing CBOE’s planned bitcoin futures contract).
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developed a new Bitcoin binary option product.323 The CFTC applied
what it described as “heightened review” to these “[v]irtual currency
self-certification[s].”324 This review included derivatives clearing
organizations (DCOs) agreeing to set “substantially high initial and
maintenance margin for cash-settled Bitcoin futures;”325 designated
contract markets (DCMs) consenting to coordination with CFTC
surveillance staff on trading activities and giving them access to
trade settlement data on request; and DCMs coordinating product
launches to allow the CFTC’s market surveillance branch to
“monitor minute-by-minute developments.”326
The CFTC recognized that the big banks that run clearinghouses
may protect their interests with regard to cryptocurrency futures
through participation in DCO risk committees or by determining
that they either will not trade cryptocurrency futures or will require
“substantially higher initial margins” to do so.327 This CFTC
guidance suggests that the agency will give clearinghouses latitude
to discriminate against virtual currency futures.
While caution often is advisable when regulating new financial
products, compelling reasons exist for the agencies to protect
emerging competition in derivatives trading. First, this competition
might reduce systemic risk in some instances. One goal of the big
banks’ anticompetitive attempts to forestall the emergence of
derivatives exchange trading is to keep lucrative derivatives trades
in the opaque OTC markets, where the banks’ profits (in the form
of bid-ask spreads) are higher.328 There is evidence that the big
banks have used their control over derivatives clearinghouses

323 See CANTOR FUTURES EXCHANGE, L.P., NEW CONTRACT SUBMISSION 2017-6: CANTOR
FUTURES
EXCHANGE
BITCOIN
SWAP
CONTRACT
1,
9
(2017),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/filings/ptc/17/12/ptc120117cantordcm001.pdf
(describing Cantor’s proposed bitcoin binary option contract and analyzing its compliance
with CFTC regulations).
324 See CFTC BACKGROUNDER, supra note 321, at 2–3.
325 Id at 3 (footnote omitted).
326 Id.
327 Id. at 4.
328 See In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014 WL
4379112, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014) (detailing allegations that Dealer–Defendants
conspired to block credit default swap exchange trading and that this “conduct harmed
plaintiffs by keeping the market opaque, preventing competition, and maintaining inflated
bid/ask spreads”).
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toward this end.329 This conduct threatens to defeat the central
systemic-risk prevention goal of Dodd–Frank’s derivatives title: to
ensure that most derivatives trades are centrally cleared.330 If the
emergent exchanges succeed, they will reduce profits on OTC trades
and undercut the big banks’ incentives to evade central clearing.
Increased competition and systemic soundness may be
complementary in this instance.
Second, heightened competition likely will make derivatives
transactions cheaper and will lower prices for end users. Big banks’
power in these markets will be reduced, and they may no longer
garner supracompetitive prices on derivatives trades. To the extent
blockchain-based competitors can emerge in other financial-services
sectors, those services may become cheaper and more accessible,
too, potentially evening the playing field for smaller investors.
If the agencies determine that increased competition in
derivatives trading is desirable, the big banks already have
provided a roadmap for the types of conduct regulators should
police. In the first instance, the agencies should be on the lookout
for big banks using control of a clearinghouse, and especially a
clearinghouse risk committee, to disfavor trades made on emergent
blockchain-based exchanges. This type of conduct was alleged in the
market for interest rates swaps, where clearinghouses refused to
clear trades entered on new public exchanges.331 The financial
regulatory agencies have the tools to prohibit such conduct. Dodd–
Frank requires that clearinghouses’ rules must provide for “[o]pen
access” and “non-discriminatory clearing” of swaps entered OTC or
through an exchange unaffiliated with a clearinghouse.332
329 See id. (“As a condition of their joining [CME’s clearinghouse], . . . Dealer–Defendants
demanded to control CME’s risk committee . . . . Operating through that committee, Dealer–
Defendants froze CME’s ability to clear trades.”).
330 See, e.g., Assessing the Regulatory, Economic, and Market Implications of the Dodd–
Frank Derivatives Title: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 55 (2011)
(statement of Terrence A. Duffy, Executive Chairman, CME Group, Inc.) (“Congress
responded to the financial crisis by adopting the Dodd–Frank Act to reduce systemic risk
through central clearing and exchange trading of derivatives . . . .”).
331 See In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d 430, 452–53 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (detailing allegations that Dealer–Defendants conspired to boycott emergent interest
rate swaps exchanges “and cause[d] their affiliated clearing entities to refuse to clear trades
on them”).
332 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(1)(B) (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(a)(2) (2018).
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To register with the regulatory agencies and to maintain their
registration, clearinghouses also must comply with Dodd–Frank’s
“Core Principles” for derivatives clearing organizations.333 Among
those Core Principles are mandates that clearinghouses’
participation and membership requirements “permit fair and open
access” and that clearinghouses maintain systems to monitor
adherence to their rules, presumably including the nondiscriminatory clearing rules.334 The Core Principles also include
“[a]ntitrust considerations,” which bar clearinghouses from
adopting rules or taking actions that result in “any unreasonable
restraint of trade” or that “impose any material anticompetitive
burden.”335 Clearinghouses that are not registered with the agencies
cannot operate, giving regulators leverage to enforce these openaccess and non-discrimination regulations.336
Another strategy the big banks have used to forestall the
emergence of derivatives exchange trading is to pressure two
important industry players—Markit Group Ltd. (Markit) and the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)—not to
provide required licenses to new exchanges.337 Markit controls two
forms of IP necessary for offering derivatives-trading services:
credit default swap (CDS) indices and reference-entity database
(RED) codes.338 The In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litigation
court found that Markit would have garnered “significant revenue”
from licensing its CDS indices and RED codes to an emergent
derivatives exchange, the Credit Market Derivatives Exchange
(CMDX), and that Markit’s directors “expressed interest” in doing
so.339 CMDX also would have needed access to ISDA’s “Master
333 Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg.
69,334 (Nov. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 21, 39, and 140).
334 Id. at 69,352, 69,436; 17 C.F.R. § 39.12(a)(1) (2019) (“The participation requirements [of
a derivatives clearing organization] shall permit fair and open access . . . .”).
335 Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,446; 17 C.F.R.
§ 39.23 (2019).
336 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(a) (2018) (outlining the registration requirements for derivatives
clearing organizations).
337 See, e.g., In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014 WL
4379112, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014) (“Dealer–Defendants convinced Markit and ISDA not
to grant any licenses . . . .”).
338 Id. at *4.
339 Id.
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Agreement,” under which CDS transactions are standardized.340
The court found that it was “in ISDA’s interest” to license the
Master Agreement to CMDX and that ISDA representatives showed
initial enthusiasm for entering such an agreement.341
Despite Markit’s and ISDA’s incentives to license CMDX and
their initial interest in doing so, the In re Credit Default Swaps
court determined that the big banks persuaded these organizations
not to license CMDX for exchange trading.342 It found that the banks
achieved this end by taking advantage of their position as Markit’s
and ISDA’s largest customers and using their influence as members
of Markit’s and ISDA’s boards.343 As a result, Markit and ISDA
acted against their own incentives and told CMDX’s sponsors, in
“synchronized fashion,” that the big banks would have to formally
approve their licensing CMDX.344 They sent CMDX draft
agreements that lacked licenses for exchange trading.345
Subsequently, “in conspicuously similar fashion,” ISDA and Markit
granted CMDX licenses for clearing that expressly barred their use
for exchange trading.346 These licenses went so far as to require that
a big bank be a part of every CDS transaction.347
It appears that Markit and ISDA will continue playing an
important role in the derivatives markets as they shift toward
blockchain-based trading. ISDA recently announced publication of
its Common Domain Model, a standardized digital representation
of all the steps in a derivatives trade.348 ISDA’s goal is to create an
industry-wide technological standard to facilitate interoperability
among industry players.349 This standard is intended to serve as the

Id.
Id.
342 Id. at *5.
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 Id.
346 Id.
347 Id. (“The licenses . . . required that some Dealer–Defendant be on at least one side of
every CDS transaction.”).
348 Press Release, ISDA, ISDA Publishes Digital Iteration of the Common Domain Model
(June 5, 2018), https://www.isda.org/2018/06/05/isda-publishes-digital-iteration-of-thecommon-domain-model/.
349 Id.; see also IAN SLOYAN, ISDA, ISDA’S COMMON DOMAIN MODEL (CDM) 7 (2020),
https://www.cftc.gov/media/3536/TAC022620_ISDACommonDomainModel/download (“ISDA
340
341
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foundation for blockchain and smart-contract applications in
derivatives trading and clearing.350 Markit also has been active in
the blockchain space, creating a product called Stax, a blockchainbased system initially tasked with handling payments for
syndicated loan trading.351 The company has stated that the system
can be used for payments in derivatives trades and other financial
markets.352 DTCC has explained that it has been “work[ing] closely”
with Markit and ISDA in implementing the blockchain-based
upgrade to its Trade Information Warehouse.353
The CFTC and SEC can reach the banks’ conduct regarding
Markit and ISDA, or similar conduct, under Dodd–Frank’s
“[a]ntitrust considerations” for swap dealers and security-based
swap dealers.354 Public and private antitrust enforcement also may
play a role in preventing conspiracies among the big banks intended
to forestall the emergence of new blockchain-based derivatives
exchanges and clearinghouses.355 However, while there is some

CDM enables interoperability between systems/services, removing burden of setting up
connections to different systems/entities . . . .”).
350 Press Release, ISDA, supra note 348.
351 Blockchain
– Beyond Cryptocurrencies, IHS MARKIT (June 28, 2018),
https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/blockchain-beyond-cryptocurrencies.html.
352 Ian Allison, IHS Markit Has a Plan to Tokenize a $1 Trillion Loan Market, COINDESK
(May 28, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/ihs-markit-plan-tokenize-1-trillionsyndicated-loan-market (quoting a Markit executive as saying, “[w]e have built [Stax] in a
generic way and we have already met with exchanges and talked about derivatives and other
asset classes”).
353 CFTC TAC MEETING, supra note 1, at 31–32 (statement of Jennifer Peve).
354 These provisions state that “[u]nless necessary or appropriate to achieve” Dodd–Frank’s
purposes “a swap dealer or major swap participant” as well as a “security-based swap dealer
or major security-based swap participant shall not” engage in conduct that “results in any
unreasonable restraint of trade” or “impose any material anticompetitive burden on trading
or clearing.” 7 U.S.C. § 6s(j)(6) (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10(j)(6) (2018). “Swap dealer[s]” are
defined in Dodd–Frank as “any person who – (i) holds itself out as a dealer in swaps; (ii)
makes a market in swaps; (iii) regularly enters into swaps with counterparties as an ordinary
course of business for its own account; or (iv) engages in any activity causing the person to be
commonly known in the trade as a dealer or market maker in swaps.” 7 U.S.C. § 1a(49)(A)
(2018). Excluded from this definition is a “person that enters into swaps” for their own
account, “but not as a part of a regular business.” Id. § 1a(49)(C). The definition of a “securitybased swap dealer” is the same. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(71)(A) (2018).
355 See, e.g., In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2017);
In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014 WL 4379112
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

79

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 2 [2020], Art. 2

578

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:499

limited history of private plaintiffs maintaining antitrust cases in
the derivatives markets, such plaintiffs face significant obstacles,
including the threat of implied antitrust immunity.356 In light of
these challenges, the financial regulatory agencies likely will play
the key role in determining whether emergent blockchain-based
derivatives trading and clearing competitors are able to survive long
enough to transform these markets.
The SEC’s 2019 no-action letter to Paxos Trust Company is a
hopeful indication that the agency will consider competition when
evaluating the role of blockchain technology in the markets it
oversees.357 Paxos offers a blockchain-based equities-settlement
service that competes with DTCC’s equities-settlement business.358
The SEC decided not to challenge Paxos’s pilot offering. Paxos
contends that its blockchain-based system will settle equities trades
faster than DTCC can do so currently using its legacy technology.359
The SEC’s openness to a blockchain-based solution that will
increase competition in equities settlement is a good sign that the
agency may be willing to make similar procompetitive decisions in
the derivatives space.
C. CAPITAL MARKETS & TOKEN SALES

While blockchain-based derivatives trading is in its nascent
stages, token sales are already a competitive factor in the capital
markets.360 The amount of money raised in ICOs and IEOs has
soared over the past several years, and this funding model has
shown genuine potential to challenge the traditional forums for

356 See supra note 313. Derivatives are regulated under Dodd–Frank, raising the possibility
of a court finding implied antitrust immunity for conduct in these markets. But see In re
Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014 WL 4379112 at *16–17
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014) (rejecting defendant derivatives dealers’ argument that Dodd–Frank
“precludes application of the antitrust laws” to alleged anticompetitive conduct).
357 Letter from Jeffrey S. Mooney, supra note 127, at 3–4.
358 Id. at 1; Osipovich, supra note 32 (noting that as a result of the SEC permitting Paxos
to continue its securities-settling pilot project, “DTCC is about to face something new:
competition”).
359 Osipovich, supra note 32 (“Today, the standard time it takes to settle a stock trade is
two business days . . . . Paxos’s initiative is aimed at settling trades at the end of the day in
which they are agreed upon, or even sooner.”).
360 See supra Section II.B.1.
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capital formation: VCs and IPOs.361 Because token sales are further
along the developmental curve, financial regulators are already
grappling with whether and how to regulate them.362 Indeed, SEC
regulation appears to have cooled the ICO market in 2019.363 Two
related questions dominate this regulatory discussion: when do
token sales qualify as sales of a security under the U.S. securities
laws and how can the agencies combat fraud in ICOs and IEOs?
The securities laws are designed to protect investors by requiring
offerors to register with the SEC and to make a number of
disclosures to potential investors.364 These laws also prohibit fraud
“in connection with” a securities transaction.365 Because these
regulations apply only if an instrument is defined as a security, the
threshold question for the SEC regarding token sales is whether
they amount to a sale of securities.366 The Securities Act of 1933
defines a security as encompassing a broad range of financial
instruments, including notes, stocks, futures, swaps, bonds, and
“investment contract[s].”367 This latter term, “investment contract,”
may capture new types of investment vehicles, such as token sales.
More than seventy years ago, in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., the U.S.
Supreme Court established a test for determining whether an
instrument is an “investment contract.”368 The Howey test defines
an investment contract as “a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
See supra notes 9, 30, & 81–89 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Clayton & Giancarlo, supra note 16 (describing the SEC’s and CFTC’s
regulatory activities in blockchain-based financial markets).
363 See Kharif, supra note 68 (“ICO sales . . . have dropped steeply . . . in the wake of a U.S.
regulatory crackdown . . . .”).
364 See, e.g., J. William Hicks, Securities Regulation: Challenges in the Decades Ahead, 68
IND. L.J. 791, 798 (1993) (“One of the essential missions of the SEC is to ensure that investors
are provided with material information and are protected from fraud and misrepresentation
in the public offering, trading, voting, and tendering of securities.”).
365 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a)(1) (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019).
366 See Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statementclayton-2017-12-11 (“[A]ny [ICO] that involves an offering of securities must be accompanied
by the important disclosures, processes and other investor protections that our securities laws
require.”).
367 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018).
368 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
361
362
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party.”369 Conforming to the securities laws’ requirements is
expensive and raises a barrier to entry for nascent forms of capital
formation, so the SEC’s (and courts’) determination of how to treat
token sales will affect their growth and competitive potential.370
As professors Jonathan Rohr and Aaron Wright have argued,
determining whether a token qualifies as a security depends on the
type of token involved. They identified two main types of tokens:
investment tokens and utility tokens.371 Investment tokens offer an
opportunity for profits.372 Utility tokens give users rights to access
a particular technology or organization.373 Rohr and Wright
contended that while the Howey analysis is straightforward as to
investment tokens, which typically will qualify as securities, its
application is unclear as to utility tokens.374 Utility tokens often are
hybrid instruments; they permit users to access a service or
technology, but some also have the potential to increase in value,
allowing holders to make a profit by selling them. Rohr and Wright
urged the SEC to create a “more predictable regulatory framework”
for utility tokens, giving offerors objective guidelines to determine
if a proposed token must be registered as a security.375 Absent such
a framework, the authors worried that offerors will avoid U.S.
markets altogether, depriving them of access to some portion of this
innovative technology.376
SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has weighed in on whether and when
tokens might qualify as securities.377 In his view, most ICOs
“involve the offer and sale of securities and directly implicate the
Id. at 298–99.
See, e.g., Lindeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[The Securities Act]
registration process is often prohibitively expensive for small companies . . . .”).
371 Rohr & Wright, supra note 2, at 475–77.
372 Id. at 476 (“[I]nvestment tokens . . . provide holders with economic rights, such as a share
of profits generated by a project or organization.”).
373 Id. at 475 (“[U]tility tokens . . . grant holders the right to access, use, and enjoy a given
technology or participate in an online organization.”).
374 Id. at 486 (asserting that investment tokens “are often securities dressed in different
clothing and thus would be subject to U.S. securities laws” whereas “the analysis [for utility
tokens] is more muddled”).
375 Id. at 515.
376 Id. at 513 (“This uncertainty will create strong incentives to engage in regulatory
arbitrage and . . . large scale migration to non-U.S. jurisdictions is a real possibility.”).
377 Clayton, supra note 366 (“A key question for all ICO market participants: ‘Is the coin or
token a security?’”).
369
370
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securities registration requirements.”378 The Chairman cast doubt
on claims that utility token offerings are not subject to the securities
laws.379 He warned that offerings whose marketing efforts
emphasize profit potential based on others’ entrepreneurial or
management efforts likely are securities offerings, especially when
promoters stress the ability to trade tokens on a secondary
market.380 In a joint opinion piece, SEC Chairman Clayton and
CFTC Chairman J. Christopher Giancarlo observed that “[c]aution
is merited” as to cryptocurrencies and ICOs, and they warned
“[m]arket participants, including lawyers, trading venues and
financial services firms,” that the agencies are “disturbed” by efforts
to avoid registration requirements for ICOs.381
By contrast, in a speech on Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies, and ICOs,
SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce argued for a cautious regulatory
approach to these technologies and for giving the market space to
innovate without undue regulation.382 She noted the “risk, when
something truly innovative comes along, that regulators will focus
only on the harms the innovation may bring and miss entirely the
opportunity it presents to improve people’s lives.”383 And she
cautioned that “undue focus on potential harm can result in an
agency’s leading with its enforcement powers, and ultimately
setting itself up as the industry’s adversary.”384 Commissioner
Peirce also observed that a regulator may insert itself
inappropriately into competitive and innovative processes,
potentially disrupting or diverting them from outcomes consumers
and investors might prefer.385 Indeed, SEC Chairman Clayton also

Id.
Id. (“Merely calling a token a ‘utility’ token or structuring it to provide some utility does
not prevent the token from being a security.”).
380 Id. (“Tokens and offerings that incorporate features and marketing efforts that
emphasize the potential for profits based on the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others continue to contain the hallmarks of a security under U.S. law.”).
381 Clayton & Giancarlo, supra note 16.
382 Peirce, supra note 305.
383 Id.
384 Id.
385 Id. (“The regulator may insert itself inappropriately into the creative process. The
regulator should be careful not to try to control the development of new technologies. . . .
[T]echnological progress should not be bound by the limits of the regulator’s lawyerly
imagination.”).
378
379
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has recognized the beneficial competitive potential of blockchainbased financial networks, although he has struck a more cautionary
tone about what he sees as the many risks ICOs and
cryptocurrencies present to investors.386
The agencies have good reason to be concerned about ICO fraud
and registration requirements. Empirical research has shown that
promises made in white papers regarding key terms of ICOs often
are not reflected in offerings’ blockchain or smart-contract code.387
Other researchers have asserted that a significant percentage of
ICOs to date have been fraudulent.388 The SEC has actively policed
ICO fraud and has brought several enforcement actions against
allegedly fraudulent coin offerings.389 To underscore the dangers of
ICO frauds, the SEC created a mock ICO website, Howeycoins.com,
inviting investors to take advantage of an “all too good to be true
investment opportunity.”390 The site includes a mock whitepaper
and other enticements ICO fraudsters commonly use.391 Browsers
who click on the “Buy Coins Now” button are directed to an investor
education page warning about the dangers of fraudulent ICOs and
how to spot a fraud.392
386 Clayton, supra note 149 (“[T]echnological innovations have improved our markets,
including through increased competition, lower barriers to entry and decreased costs for
market participants. Distributed ledger and other emerging technologies have the potential
to further influence and improve the capital markets and the financial services industry.”).
Chairman Clayton asserted that his “key consideration” in dealing with cryptocurrencies and
ICOs “is to serve the long term interests of our Main Street investors,” and that the SEC’s
efforts “have been driven . . . most significantly by the concern that too many Main Street
investors do not understand all the material facts and risks involved.” Id.
387 See, e.g., Cohney et al., supra note 22, at 640 (“Our results show that the majority of the
top-grossing ICOs of 2017 had major problems with how code bore out their antiexploitation
disclosures.”).
388 SATIS GROUP, supra note 14, at 1 (noting that “over 80% of [cryptoasset] projects (by #
share) were identified as scams” although “[o]ver 70% of ICO funding (by $ volume) to-date
went to higher quality projects”).
389 See supra notes 16 & 40.
390 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The SEC Has an Opportunity You Won’t
Want to Miss: Act Now! (May 16, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-88.
391 Id. (“The website features several of the enticements that are common to fraudulent
offerings, including a white paper with a complex yet vague explanation of the investment
opportunity, promises of guaranteed returns, and a countdown clock that shows time is
quickly running out on the deal of a lifetime.”).
392 ICO-Howeycoins: If You Responded to an Investment Offer Like This, You Could Have
Been Scammed – Howeycoins are Completely Fake!, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
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Still, there is reason to hope that financial regulators might be
more receptive to the competitive potential of token sales than to
other forms of blockchain-based financial-services competition,
particularly in trading and clearing. Encouraging capital formation
is a primary policy goal for these agencies, on par with consumer
protection and maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets.393
Promoting competition in capital formation forwards the agencies’
mission in a way that has prompted agency leaders to trumpet the
advantages of innovation in this space. SEC Chairman Clayton has
stated his belief that ICOs “can be effective ways for entrepreneurs
and others to raise funding, including for innovative projects.”394 He
explained that “the SEC [is] committed to promoting capital
formation” and asserted that “[t]he technology on which
cryptocurrencies and ICOs are based may prove to be disruptive,
transformative and efficiency enhancing.”395 Indeed, Chairman
Clayton has recognized some of the broader economic and social
goals blockchain-based capital formation may help achieve,
including opening capital markets to smaller businesses and new
investors.396
Rohr and Wright explored the tension between the SEC’s fraud
prevention and capital-formation missions, noting that the
increased regulatory clarity necessary to encourage growth of this
new funding model also might be viewed by the agency as a
“roadmap to fraud.”397 But harmonization of the agency’s capitalformation mission and its competition mandate is also important
and should push the SEC to issue guidance and pursue enforcement

https://www.investor.gov/howeycoins (last visited Feb. 7, 2021) (“[The SEC] created the bogus
HoweyCoins.com site as an educational tool to alert investors to possible fraud involving
digital assets like . . . coin offerings.”).
393 See Clayton, supra note 149 (describing the SEC’s “tripartite mission to protect
investors, maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets and facilitate capital formation”).
394 Clayton, supra note 366.
395 Id.
396 Clayton, supra note 149 (“Businesses, especially smaller businesses without efficient
access to traditional capital markets, can be aided by financial technology in raising capital
to establish and finance their operations, thereby allowing them to be more competitive both
domestically and globally. And these technological innovations can provide investors with
new opportunities to offer support and capital to novel concepts and ideas.”).
397 Rohr & Wright, supra note 2, at 512, 515 (quoting A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time
for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1086 (2005)).
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actions that promote the development of blockchain-based capital
formation.
The SEC has made some important efforts in this regard. In a
2018 speech, William Hinman, Director of the Division of Corporate
Finance at the SEC, described circumstances under which a digital
asset transaction initially characterized as a sale of a security
eventually may cease to be a security offering.398 He suggested that
this could occur if the network on which the token functions is
“sufficiently decentralized,” so that “purchasers would no longer
reasonably expect a person or group to carry out essential
managerial or entrepreneurial efforts.”399 Hinman contended that
“[a]s a network becomes truly decentralized, the ability to identify
an issuer or promoter to make the requisite disclosures becomes
difficult, and less meaningful.”400
Regulatory agency efforts to encourage the growth of token sales
will not go unopposed by incumbent financial firms whose business
models are threatened by this new funding alternative. The
Competition Committee of the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development’s Directorate for Financial and
Enterprise Affairs has cautioned that entrenched financial
institutions may resist the growth of independent blockchain-based
financial networks by appealing to regulators to raise barriers to
entry and “exaggerating the safety risks of the technology.”401 This
prediction is being borne out. NASDAQ, for example, stands to lose
a critical stream of business if token sales replace NASDAQ IPOs.
NASDAQ’s CEO, Adena Friedman, has warned retail investors not
to participate in unregulated ICOs, which she described as a way to
“take[] advantage of people,” especially unsophisticated investors
like “Auntie Mae in Iowa.”402

398 See William Hinman, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Digital Asset
Transactions:
When
Howey
Met
Gary
(Plastic)
(June
14,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418 (discussing the instances where a
digital asset transaction will be taken “out of the purview of the U.S. securities laws”).
399 Id.
400 Id.
401 OECD BLOCKCHAIN AND COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 6.
402 Kate Rooney, Nasdaq CEO says ICOs are ‘Taking Advantage’ of Retail Investors, CNBC
(June 20, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/20/nasdaq-ceo-says-icos-aretaking-advantage-of-retail-investors.html (“To make it no rules at all, when companies can
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D. STANDARD SETTING & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-RELATED
RISKS

Other tools incumbent financial institutions might use to turn
back challenges from independent blockchain-based financial
networks include standard-setting and strategic patent
acquisitions. In some sectors with emerging blockchain-based
competitors, interoperability among networks may be necessary for
markets to function efficiently. Derivatives markets are an
example. Competitive derivatives markets might feature multiple
exchanges and clearinghouses, which would need to work
collaboratively for efficient trading to take place. Standardization of
blockchain-based derivatives trading and clearing would facilitate
interoperability. ISDA—with the backing of Barclays, Goldman
Sachs, and other incumbent financial firms—has been developing
its common domain model (CDM) to standardize blockchain-based
derivatives trading.403 The CDM, according to ISDA, “provides a
standard digital representation of events and actions that occur
during the life of a derivatives trade.”404
How will standardization affect the development of blockchain
technology in the financial sector? Much depends on which entities
control any standard-setting processes. ISDA’s efforts to create a
standard for blockchain-based derivatives trading, while potentially
benign or even procompetitive, require scrutiny. As discussed above,
there is already a history of ISDA—responding to pressure brought
by the big banks—denying an emergent derivatives exchange the IP
necessary to compete.405 Regulators and antitrust authorities
just willy-nilly take people’s money and offer no information at all, with no governance, that
sounds to me like you’re taking advantage of people.”).
403 See Press Release, ISDA, supra note 348; Ian Allison, Barclays, Goldman Champion
ISDA Standard for Blockchain Derivatives, COINDESK (Apr. 26, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://www.coindesk.com/barclays-goldman-champion-isda-standard-blockchainderivatives (“[T]he financial world’s blockchain evangelists are pinning their hopes on [the
CDM] to harmonize the way [derivatives] data is presented and reported, regardless of the
platform used.”).
404 Press Release, ISDA, supra note 348.
405 See In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014 WL 4379112
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014) (“As for CMDX, Dealer–Defendants convinced . . . ISDA not to
grant any licenses . . . .”). For further discussion of this history, see supra notes 337–347 and
accompanying text.
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should be concerned that any standard ISDA and the big banks set
might be similarly abused to disfavor new competitors by denying
them licenses necessary to use the CDM.
Other organizations have been racing to create blockchain-based
platforms for financial-services applications.406 The R3 consortium,
initially backed by several Wall Street banks (some of which have
since dropped out), has launched two versions of its Corda platform:
an “open source blockchain platform” and a presumably proprietary
“commercial version . . . for enterprise usage.”407 R3 claims both
platforms will “enabl[e] businesses to transact directly and in strict
privacy” using smart contracts, “reducing transaction and recordkeeping costs.”408 Subsequently, a number of large financial
institutions joined the competing Ethereum Enterprise Alliance,
which strives to “drive the use of Ethereum blockchain technology
as an open-standard to empower ALL enterprises.”409 Hyperledger
is a similar consortium vying to create open-source blockchain
networks.410 It is hosted by the Linux Foundation and supported by
a range of companies, including big financial and technology
firms.411
To the extent that any blockchain standards that result from this
process are open and can be practiced by emergent firms,
competition concerns should recede. But if the standards are
proprietary, controlled by big financial and tech firms, and
See supra note 111–126, 134–136 and accompanying text.
R3, CORDA ENTERPRISE: DELIVERING A BLOCKCHAIN PLATFORM FOR ALL BUSINESSES 1,
4, https://www.r3.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/US_07_CordaEnterprise_FS_JUN26_
final.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2021). One-time members Goldman Sachs, Banco Santander,
and J.P. Morgan dropped out of the consortium. See Jeff John Roberts, Blockchain Firm R3
is Running out of Money, Sources Say, FORTUNE (June 7, 2018, 11:10 AM),
http://fortune.com/2018/06/07/blockchain-firm-r3-is-running-out-of-money-sources-say/.
408 R3, supra note 407, at 1.
409 About, ENTERPRISE ETHEREUM ALLIANCE, https://entethalliance.org/about/ (last visited
Feb. 9, 2021). Members include J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, Banco Santander, and the Bank of
ETHEREUM
ALLIANCE,
New
York
Mellon.
EEA
Members,
ENTERPRISE
https://entethalliance.org/eea-members/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2021).
410 About Hyperledger, HYPERLEDGER, https://www.hyperledger.org/about (last visited Feb.
9, 2021) (“Hyperledger is an open source community focused on developing a suite of stable
frameworks, tools and libraries for enterprise-grade blockchain deployments.”).
411 Members, HYPERLEDGER, https://www.hyperledger.org/about/members (last visited Feb.
9, 2021) (showing that Hyperledger’s “premier members” include Accenture, DTCC, Hitachi,
IBM, and J.P. Morgan).
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inaccessible to nascent competitors, the potential for blockchainbased competition to transform the financial markets may be
frustrated. This threat is especially concerning for standards that
incorporate patents owned by incumbent financial firms and their
technology partners.
Unsurprisingly, a race to patent blockchain-related technologies
is well underway.412 Already, Bank of America has filed for or
received at least eighty blockchain-related patents.413 Other
financial firms are attempting to create similar patent portfolios,
including Mastercard, Visa, and Accenture.414 Technology
companies, including IBM and Intel, are also among the leading
owners of blockchain-related patents.415 Moving quickly to claim IP
rights over blockchain-related inventions makes sense, considering
the growing number of possible uses for these technologies, and
stockpiling these IP assets is not inherently anticompetitive. Firms
like Bank of America might be planning to license their blockchainrelated patents to all comers as a way to monetize their research
and development in this area. Or they might intend to use these
patents defensively, ensuring they have IP rights available to crosslicense to gain access to competitors’ blockchain technologies.
Without a portfolio of blockchain-related patents, firms might find
that they cannot develop their own competitive blockchain networks
and could risk being shut out of the sector altogether.416

412 See, e.g., Malathi Nayak, Blockchain Patent Race Is on, but Hurdles Await, BLOOMBERG
LAW NEWS (May 30, 2018, 5:02 AM) (“A wide array of corporations, including Alphabet Inc.’s
Google and Bank of America, are lining up to enter a potentially lucrative club: one that
allows them to own patents on blockchain technology.”).
413 See Hugh Son, Bank of America Tech Chief Is Skeptical on Blockchain Even Though
BofA Has the Most Patents for It, CNBC (Mar. 26, 2019, 6:58 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/25/bank-of-america-skeptical-on-blockchain-despite-havingmost-patents.html (“[Bank of America] has applied for or received 82 blockchain-related
patents, more than any other financial firm . . . .”).
414 See Largest Blockchain Patent Owners in the United States as of 2019, by Number of
Active Patent Families, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1022077/blockchainpatent-owners-united-states-authority/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2021).
415 Id.
416 See Lucinda Shen, Here’s Why Bank of America Has Filed Nearly 50 Blockchain-Related
Patents, FORTUNE (June 20, 2018, 5:51 PM), https://fortune.com/2018/06/20/bank-of-americablockchain-patent-why/ (stating that Bank of America is filing blockchain-related patents
because it “doesn’t want to be left behind”).
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Another strategy blockchain patent holders might pursue is
creating patent pools for specific blockchain standards or
technologies. Patent pools are collections of patents necessary for
adhering to a technical standard or making specific products.417 The
patents in the pools are contributed by their various owners, and
the pools offer licenses to all the patents they contain.418 When
designed with certain competitive safeguards, patent pools offer
important efficiencies.419 They reduce transaction costs for
implementers: rather than entering separate licensing negotiations
with the holders of all the patents necessary to adhere to a standard
or build a product, implementers can pay one price and get all the
patent licenses in a bundle.420 Pool licenses also may be less
expensive than acquiring individual licenses to all the necessary
patents.421 By simplifying licensing, patent pools for blockchainrelated technologies could encourage more rapid innovation.
Early indications suggest that at least some blockchain-related
patent holders are interested in using their IP rights defensively
and collaboratively, rather than to quash innovation. Ken Seddon,
chief executive officer of LOT Networks, a non-profit created to
immunize its members from lawsuits filed by patent assertion
entities, has argued that “[b]anks are taking a defensive posture
when it comes to blockchain” and that their patent filings are aimed
at safeguarding their innovations and protecting themselves in
licensing negotiations.422
While there are benign reasons for stockpiling blockchain-related
patents, these patent portfolios also create opportunities for
anticompetitive conduct. Should a Bank of America or J.P. Morgan
Chase patent be incorporated into a blockchain standard and
become a standard-essential patent (SEP), those firms could holdup competitors for supracompetitive licensing fees. The Antitrust
Division’s recent policy statements, indicating that it is less
417 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 64 (2007).
418 Id.
419 Id. at 64–65 (explaining that patent pools help to mitigate “hold up” and “hold out”
problems, reduce transaction costs, and reduce risks and costs of litigation).
420 Id. at 65.
421 Id.
422 Jeff John Roberts, As Blockchain Grows, Companies Look to Avert a Patent War,
FORTUNE (June 19, 2018, 12:08 PM), https://fortune.com/2018/06/19/blockchain-patent/.
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concerned with SEP hold-up than in the past, could invite this type
of abuse.423 Similar competitive risks might arise if holders of
blockchain-related patents decide to form a patent pool. Although
patent pools have procompetitive potential, they also can be used to
harm competition.424 For example, if a patent pool is designed to
charge lower licensing fees to holders of pool patents than to
outsiders, and big banks and big tech companies hold the pool
patents, the pool could undermine competitive challenges from
insurgent firms lacking pool patents.425 The FTC and Antitrust
Division have cautioned that they typically will not evaluate “the
reasonableness” of patent pool royalty rates and will not “presume
that different royalty payments faced by different licensees . . . are
anticompetitive.”426 This somewhat hands-off approach to the
structure of patent pool royalty rates might encourage blockchain
patent pools to charge discriminatory rates to nascent competitors,
potentially retarding competition and innovation.
In the absence of antitrust agency action, the potential for
anticompetitive abuse of SEPs and patent pools by holders of
blockchain-related patents may merit regulatory attention. If
evidence emerges that blockchain-related patent holders are
charging exorbitant and discriminatory licensing fees to forestall
the emergence of new competitors in financial services, a regulatory
or legislative response may be necessary to safeguard competition
in these markets.

423 See, e.g., Delrahim, supra note 268, at 2 (“[T]he theory and evidence of unilateral ‘holdup’ by patent-holders does not provide an adequate basis to condemn such conduct under the
antitrust laws generally.”).
424 See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 417, at 77 (explaining
how patent pools containing substitute patents that compete with one another, rather than
solely complementary patents, “may have the anticompetitive effect of increasing the total
royalty rate to licensees”); id. at 81 (explaining that patent pools could enable competitors to
exchange competitively sensitive proprietary information in an effort to facilitate
downstream price-fixing).
425 Id. at 82 (noting a hearing panelist’s concerns “that a pool that charges smaller royalties
to licensors that are also licensees (insiders) than it charges to pure licensees (outsiders)
might produce anticompetitive effects in downstream markets . . . [,] ‘allow[ing] inefficient
[licensor] competitors to dominate downstream markets by combining the power of the
patents in the pool to the exclusion of efficient independent competitors’” (third alteration in
original)).
426 Id. at 82–83.
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Congress and financial regulators also should be watchful for,
and prepared to respond to, potential abuses of the standard-setting
process in blockchain networks. Efforts by incumbent financial
institutions to shoehorn their proprietary technology into privately
set or government standards may signal an intent to use that IP to
raise rivals’ costs to practice the standard.427 As standards are set,
regulators should be aware of the possibility that members of
blockchain SSOs might abuse those standards by falsely warning
potential customers that emergent competitors’ networks do not
meet the relevant requirements and either lack interoperability or
are in some way dangerous for customers.
Regulators’ goal in making these efforts should be to facilitate
the procompetitive benefits of standardization in blockchain-related
financial services while preventing anticompetitive abuses of the
standardization process or blockchain-related IP. In doing so, the
agencies should aim to create and preserve the type of open-access
and non-discriminatory environment that the federal government
was able to achieve in the early days of the Internet.

VI. CONCLUSION
Blockchain-based technologies already are transforming the way
business is done across a broad spectrum of markets. Big companies
like J.P. Morgan and DTCC have adopted blockchain to run key
portions of their infrastructures, making clear that this is no longer
a fringe technology. By eliminating the need for the trust-based
services that incumbent institutions historically have provided,
blockchain offers the possibility for a competitive renaissance
throughout the economy—especially in the financial-services sector.
This renaissance could be derailed in several ways, however, and
sector regulators will play an important role in shaping how this
story plays out. Unlike the FCC, which generally has employed a
steady hand in guiding competition policy for the Internet, the SEC
and CFTC historically have been indifferent stewards of
competition. This indifference may prove problematic as blockchain
restructures financial-services markets.

427

See supra note 265.
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This Article has identified three key challenges regulators must
grapple with in managing competition policy for blockchain
technology: balancing blockchain’s promise of increased competition
against concerns for marketplace and consumer safety; determining
the appropriate level of market decentralization to encourage or
tolerate; and deciding whether and how to promote standardization,
open-access, and non-discrimination requirements on blockchain
networks. This Article also has suggested ways the agencies might
meet these challenges. It applied this analysis to four specific
blockchain competition-related issues that have arisen or are likely
to arise in financial-services markets: (1) paid prioritization, (2) the
expansion of blockchain-based derivatives trading, (3) the boom in
token sales, and (4) the potential use of standard-setting and IP
rights to limit blockchain competition.
The Article looked to the FCC’s pre-2017 approach to Internet
regulation as a model to suggest that financial regulators should
employ a default rule promoting blockchain-based competition
structured around open access and non-discrimination unless
entities can prove that a particular application is unsafe for
consumers or the economy. This strategy offers the best chance for
blockchain networks to realize their potential to make financialservices markets more competitive and more democratic—an
outcome that might reduce the grip of the big banks and big tech in
this sector. This Article’s approach to blockchain competition policy
in the financial sector can also inform regulatory responses in other
markets as blockchain expands its reach across the economy.
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